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REVIEW

A Fox in the Hedges: Vermeule's Vision of
Optimized Constitutionalism in a
Suboptimal World
Jonathan Turleyt
The Constitutionof Risk
Adrian Vermeule. Cambridge, 2013. 191 pages.
INTRODUCTION

When Isaiah Berlin wrote his famous 1953 book on Leo
Tolstoy's view of history, he began with a line from the ancient
Greek poet Archilochus: "The fox knows many things, but the
hedgehog knows one big thing."' It is a line that captures two
types of intellectuals: those who advance many insular and interstitial ideas, and those who advance big theories that bring a
single unifying theme or idea to the world. These two types of
thinkers come to mind when reading Harvard Law School professor Adrian Vermeule's fascinating new book, The Constitution
of Risk.2 Vermeule has said that his "mad ambition" is to offer a
unifying constitutional theory to bring order to a field crowded
with too many theories. 3 In doing so, he seeks to fulfill what

t J.B. and Maurice C. Shapiro Professor of Public Interest Law, George
Washington University Law School. I want to thank the members of The University of
Chicago Law Review for their hard work in preparing this Review for publication.
1 Isaiah Berlin, The Hedgehog and the Fox: An Essay on Tolstoy's View of History 1
(Simon & Schuster 1953). I am not alone in thinking of this passage after reading
Vermeule's work. Recently, I had the chance to listen to a panel discussion of the book at
Harvard with Vermeule, and Professor Richard Fallon noted the same Berlin line in his
comments on the book. See hlslib, Book Talk: Adrian Vermeule on The Constitution of
Risk 41:51-43:20 (Apr 29, 2014), online at https://www.youtube.comnwatch?v=
Ls3uclq6u Q (visited Feb 18, 2015) ("Book Talk").
2 Vermeule initially published some of the core concepts in this book in a series of
law review publications. See generally Adrian Vermeule, Precautionary Principles in
Constitutional Law, 4 J Legal Analysis 181 (2012); Adrian Vermeule, Introduction:Political Risk and Public Law, 4 J Legal Analysis 1 (2012).
3 Book Talk at 3:38 (cited in note 1).
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Samuel Johnson once hoped for a new generation in 1770: "deliverance from unnecessary terrours, and exemption from false
alarms." 4 Deliverance in this case is from precautionary rules
designed to combat risks that are unlikely to arise and rules
that distort decisionmaking by government officials, judges, and
other constitutional actors. Vermeule posits that emancipation
from such "terrours" can come only with a fundamental shift
away from traditional Madisonian concepts in favor of a more
modern view of governmental realities. That certainly sounds
very hedgehog-like, but on closer examination, Vermeule proves
something of a fox in hedgehog garb. Vermeule's single big idea
is to avoid a single big idea in the context of constitutional analysis.
In other words, the hedgehog's advice is to be a fox.5
Vermeule's book is impressive in its detail, and its synthesis
of different theories offers a new perspective in approaching
some long-standing problems. Regardless of how one views his
ultimate conclusions, Vermeule's unique view of constitutionalism is likely to leave a lasting impact on scholarship in this area. However, an appreciation for the book is found more in what
it is than in what it is intended to be. Vermeule's critique of past
theories reveals a type of antitheory theory, or at least a rejection of a single overarching theory of constitutionalism. The considerable value of this book is found in its detail of risk regulation and not in the big theory advanced by Vermeule. That may
not be enough for Vermeule's "mad ambition," but it should be
enough for any reader interested in a penetrating analysis of the
role of constitutions in the regulation of risk.
Vermeule's book advances two distinct propositions. 6 The
first (and the greatest contribution of the book) is that constitutions should be viewed as devices for regulating political risks.
Those political risks are referred to as "second-order risks," as
opposed to "first-order risks" such as wars, diseases, and other
social ills (p 3). Vermeule details how much of the Framers' debate reflects a view of the Constitution as a regulation of risk in
Samuel Johnson, The FalseAlarm 3 (E. Lynch 1st ed 1770).
See Book Talk at 54:32-54:55 (cited in note 1). Vermeule has expressed a dislike
for Berlin's dichotomy and has embraced the notion that a true hedgehog would want to
be a fox. See id.
6
The premise of the book is laid out simply and clearly in the very first line of the
introduction: "I have two claims to offer. One is that constitutional rulemaking is best
understood as a means to regulate and manage political risks. The other is that an approach I will call 'optimizing constitutionalism' is the best approach to constitutional risk
management" (p 1).
4

5
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governance (pp 52-87). Vermeule portrays many of these risks
as "fat-tail risks" that are "exceedingly unlikely to materialize,
but more likely than in a normal distribution, and [ ] are exceedingly damaging if they do materialize" (p 49). Under "maximin
constitutional" approaches, Vermeule suggests that precautionary rules can overcompensate for the low-likelihood risks and
even cause the very danger that they seek to prevent (pp 71-72).
He offers the separation of powers as an example:
Consider the possibility ...that the separation of executive
and legislative powers, erected in part as a precaution
against either executive dictatorship or legislative tyranny,
is itself a risk factor for dictatorship or tyranny, perhaps because the separation of powers gridlocks the lawmaking
system and thus created pent-up public demand for strong
extraconstitutional action. (p 80)
While acknowledging that this is a "remote" possibility, it is a
suggestion that Vermeule returns to repeatedly in the book in
suggesting that limits on presidential power might trigger presidential abuses or the rise of counterrisks (p 80).7 The suggestion
captures Vermeule's view of precautionary constitutionalism as
myopic in its focus on certain risks. The notion of unappreciated
or unaccommodated risks is central to Vermeule's second proposition: the best way to regulate risk is to avoid obsessive views
on risk avoidance or precautions and, instead, to allow greater
flexibility in addressing the full array of risks inherent in government (p 52). This "optimizing constitutionalism" is an answer
to those who frame their understanding of the Constitution
along more-rigid precautionary principles (p 24). As will be discussed below, I remain highly skeptical of both propositions, but
Vermeule's nuanced treatment of constitutional risk regulation
is an intriguing perspective. While I am unpersuaded by
Vermeule's proposed abandonment of precautionary constitutional rules, his arguments illuminate some of the core issues in
this long-standing debate.
Vermeule maintains that his two propositions in The Constitution of Risk are "partially independent" (p 10). I certainly
agree that it is possible to accept the first concept of the Constitution as an instrument to regulate political risks without
7
As discussed below, Vermeule has a long-standing criticism of separation of powers claims and the viability of checks and balances in modern government. See notes
136-48 and accompanying text.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[82:517

accepting Vermeule's theory of optimizing constitutionalism.
However, it would be more challenging to accept the theory of
optimizing constitutionalism without adopting Vermeule's riskcentric vision of constitutional rulemaking. Indeed, for functionalists, the thrust of optimizing constitutionalism will be highly
appealing. Thus, it is not surprising that academics like Professor Cass Sunstein describe the book as "one of the best constitutional law books in the last half-century."8 One can disagree
with Vermeule (as I do) on his big theory and still greatly value
the book (as I also do). However, the second goal of the book in
establishing this theory is more revealing for what it does not
establish than for what it proposes. It does indeed come down to
a question of risk and, as discussed below, what exactly that
means. Vermeule divides his work into these two distinct propositions, which I will discuss (and critique) separately. I have also
tried to use Vermeule's own words as much as possible to allow
the reader to consider his arguments directly and thereby minimize translation bias.
Part I of this Review briefly discusses Vermeule's concept of
risk regulation in constitutional rulemaking and his distinction
between first-order and second-order risks-a subject that I return to at the end of the Review. In Part II, I address Vermeule's
description of precautionary constitutionalism and his use of
theories of futility, jeopardy, perversity, and ex post remedies to
evaluate its success as a regulation of risk. Vermeule's discussion of past theories under the rubric of precautionary constitutionalism is a highlight of the book, offering a single conceptual
framework running from David Hume to James Madison to contemporary theorists. His critique of precautionary constitutionalism, however, sometimes appears forced and artificial, even
considering the largely abstract level of discussion in the work.
By defining this prior work as focused on risk avoidance, Vermeule attempts to show how precautionary constitutionalism
fails in this purpose, can prove futile in combating those risks
that rulemakers "obsessively" fixate on, and can even create new
collateral risks (p 187). Moreover, Vermeule engages in arguments that are classic examples of the "reaction rhetoric" described by Professor Albert Hirschman in his classic work on the
futility, jeopardy, and perversity theses. 9 While Vermeule seeks
Book Talk at 21:01-21:10 (cited in note 1).
9 See generally Albert 0. Hirschman, The Rhetoric of Reaction: Perversity,Futility,
Jeopardy (Belknap 1991). See also notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
8
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to present precautionary constitutionalism "in charitable terms,
in order to put them in their best possible light," (p 28) his
analysis reveals "little patience" for opposing constitutional
theories that are presented as seeking to avoid a narrow range
of risks. 1° Vermeule's failure to make the best case of precautionary constitutionalism-and particularly the values that it
seeks to protect-undermines the credibility of his later arguments in support of his theory of optimizing constitutionalism.
In Part III, I turn to Vermeule's second proposition in favor
of optimizing constitutionalism, including his ultimate description of "virtues" to guide rulemakers in the use of a "mature" optimizing position (p 187). While insular issues like agency decisionmaking may naturally favor the flexible and balanced
approach that Vermeule advocates, there remain sweeping generalities even in the "applications" section of the book (see, for
example, pp 176-85). The lack of concreteness no doubt fits with
Vermeule's desire to inspire "[c]onstitutional [r]ulemaking
[w]ithout a [s]tyle" (p 186); however, it also lacks a certain substance in terms of how the theory can advance decisionmaking.
The theory and the related Vermeulean virtues remain underdeveloped to the point that they are difficult to objectively evaluate. While questioning Vermeule's optimizing position may appear a case for "immaturity,"" the vague quality of much of the
analysis raises concerns over its viability as an applied theory
and the danger of the neutral-sounding risk lexicon hiding inherent bias. Accordingly, I look most closely at Vermeule's
treatment of the recent controversy of recess appointments as a
concrete context for evaluating the usefulness of this theory.
That application magnifies the concerns over the lack of definition of some of the key terms in Vermeule's analysis. Yet, his
theory does achieve part of what Vermeule desires. For functionalists, it offers a new basis for an approach founded in risk
theory. His big idea as no big idea is certainly novel and holds a
certain "uncola" appeal in the context of old, labored theories.
However, for those who harbor formalist tendencies, it will likely
taste a lot like the old Coke of functionalism when you take it to
its inevitable finish.

10 Book Talk at 5:35-5:52 (cited in note 1).
11 Vermeule takes the "mature" position terminology from Hirschman, though the
use of this and other Hirschmanian terms is a curious choice given their original use. See
notes 33-42 and accompanying text.
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In Part IV, I summarize the problems identified in the two
propositions of Vermeule's work (particularly the second proposition of a unifying, risk-centric theory) into two basic critiques:
the uncertain definition and weight given to different types of
risks in trade-offs, and the failure to properly account for other
constitutional values-particularly in the constitutional structure itself. What should be a compelling discussion of risk avoidance underlying constitutional rulemaking is undermined by the
need to overextend this one dimension of government decisionmaking to support Vermeule's ultimate theory. Ironically,
while criticizing those who obsess over theories like precautionary constitutionalism, Vermeule succumbs to the same seduction
in trying to advance risk avoidance as the overriding purpose of
the Constitution to the exclusion of other organizing concepts.
This risk-centric analysis tends to devalue such positive conceptions as deliberative democracy and ordered liberty. Something
is lost in the translation of such values into risks. When those
risks are addressed, the analysis often seems subjective, if not
outcome determinative. For example, Vermeule's treatment of
risks such as aggrandizement reveals not only his own skeptical
view of the real danger presented by the rise of a more powerful
executive but also the relativistic quality of his risk analysis
(p 60). In the end, I am not sold on Vermeule's elevation of risk
as an all-encompassing purpose of constitutional design and
rulemaking. Moreover, unless one adopts a more fungible notion
of risk, I do not believe that the case is made that precautionary
constitutionalism, as Vermeule calls it, is suboptimal for risk. It
depends on how one weighs the risks involved in governing, even
if one accepts risk analysis as the best measure for success of a
constitutional system. Indeed, if one considers certain risks such
as aggrandizement as existential threats to a constitutional system, Vermeule's optimizing constitutional approach hardly
seems optimal in any sense, including as a mechanism of risk
regulation.
To conclude, I discuss an alternative view of constitutional
structure from a more deontological perspective. While the
Framers clearly saw constitutional rules as avoiding particular
risks, constitutional structure is also tied to normative values
and cannot be accurately reduced to a purely instrumental
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function.12 Without delving too far into that alternative view, the
concern is with the distortive effect of Vermeule's overarching
threshold assumption as to the function of the system. In the
end, the reader ends up where she began: trying to understand
risk and, more importantly, what Vermeule understands as the
risks (and purpose) of constitutional structure.
I. RISKS OF THE FIRST AND SECOND ORDER: THE ROLE OF RISK
REGULATION IN CONSTITUTIONAL RULEMAKING

Vermeule seeks in this book to create what he views as a
missing framework for addressing governmental conflicts and
questions. In past theories, Vermeule sees a cacophony of different purposes for constitutions-ranging from protecting minority rights to preserving equality and human dignity (p 1). Each of
these theories is viewed by Vermeule as focusing on a "good
promoted by constitutionalism" (p 2) without an overarching analytic concept. Past efforts are criticized as "stock theories"
showing "too little understanding of how the plural aims and
values of constitutionalism relate to one another" (p 2).
Vermeule sees constitutional conflicts as the manifestation of
"risk-saturated tradeoffs among constitutional goods" (p 2). His
alternative approach, he argues, supplies this missing framework by treating "constitutions, and public law generally, [as]
best understood as devices for regulating and managing political
risks" (p 2) (emphasis omitted). Through the lens of risk, Vermeule sees greater clarity and continuity in an otherwiseconfusing world of constitutional conflicts:
Constitutions ...

may be justified and criticized as more or

less successful devices for managing a range of risks that
arise in and from politics, including tyranny and dictatorship, self-dealing by officials, akratic decision making by
majorities, exploitative oppression of minorities, and various forms of bias or corruption in adjudication, regulation,
and political decision making. (pp 2-3)
In a book on the role of constitutions in the regulation of
risk, the obvious question is how to define the relevant risks.
Vermeule answers this question by separating "first-order risks"
from "second-order risks" (p 3) (emphasis omitted). First-order
12 See generally Jonathan Turley, Madisonian Tectonics: How Form Follows Function in Constitutionaland Architectural Interpretation,83 Geo Wash L Rev (forthcoming
2015) (on file with author).
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risks are those risks that are "dealt with by substantive governmental policies" (p 3). These are risks that "arise as the unintended consequence of human action"-ranging from financial
crises to terrorism (p 3). Second-order risks are those risks that
"arise from the design of institutions, from the allocation of power across institutions to make first-order decisions, and from the
selection of officials to staff institutions" (pp 3-4). These are the
risks that occupy most of Vermeule's attention:
Constitutional law structures the power of government and
allocates it in complex ways to a set of institutions, themselves constituted by the same law. Any such structure creates the chance of various good or bad political consequences, just as any policy for regulating nuclear power creates
the chance of various good or bad environmental and economic consequences. Constitutional rulemakers will have to
assess and then somehow compare and balance the goods
and bads that might arise from various institutional designs
and allocations of power across institutions-precisely the
sort of decision that risk analysis addresses. (p 4)
That, however, still does not clearly define "risk" as opposed to
the order of risk. Risk can be defined along lines of uncertainty
or ignorance as to the possible or probable outcomes of different
decisions. Vermeule declines to explicitly define risk and instead
embraces what he calls a "colloquial" sense of the word, including concepts of risk, uncertainty, and ignorance under "one large
umbrella" (p 6). Vermeule does make a critical choice in defining
"political risk" (p 8). He acknowledges that political risk is commonly defined in economic legal analysis as "the risk that a government will expropriate property or violate a contract without
providing adequate compensation" (p 8).13 Vermeule rejects this
definition as too narrow because it does not include nonproperty
risks to liberty, equality, and democracy (p 9). It is a fair point.
However, Vermeule's definition of risk then becomes so broad as
to distort the later analysis. All risks are not equal, or, at least
in an analytical Animal Farm, some risks are more equal than
others.
The lack of a clear definition of the scope of risks-and their
relative weight-will later undermine Vermeule's argument
13 Vermeule draws this quote from Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, and Eric A.
Posner, The Evolution of ContractualTerms in Sovereign Bonds, 4 J Legal Analysis 131,
131 (2012).
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when he moves to use those unaddressed, amorphous risks to
skewer the premise of precautionary constitutionalism. For example, Vermeule notes that Kelo v City of New London 14 entails
risks to goods that go beyond property or contractual rights
(p 10). For those of us who have been critical of the Kelo decision,15 that is certainly true. Yet, it is clear that Vermeule is not
thinking of the risks to democracy and individual rights, but rather the countervailing risks that the government seeks to address by taking private property under eminent domain (p 63).
The Court's capacious definition of "public use" embraces a
broad array of risks to the public and thus represents an "approach [that] fits comfortably" with this theory of optimizing
constitutionalism (p 10). The Kelo ruling seems to appeal to
Vermeule because it gives greater flexibility to decisionmakers
in defining public use, leaving most of these controversies to political, rather than constitutional, checks.16 There are clearly
many who support the decision, including those who elevate po17
litical remedies over legal remedies in such controversies.
However, it remains unclear how the risk of the broader definition of public use is balanced against the risks to private
property interests.
Vermeule's relatively brief discussion of the meaning of risk
is a telling and ultimately problematic part of his theory of constitutionalism. There is an obvious irony in the relative vagueness of the definition and comparative treatment of risk.
Vermeule makes some compelling points about prior theories
that often deal in generalities or target risks with little evidence
that such risks are serious or likely to occur. Yet the same
545 US 469 (2005).
See, for example, Kelo v City of New London US Supreme Court Decision and
Strengthening the Ownership of Private Property Act of 2005, Hearing before the House
Committee on Agricultureon HR 3405, 109th Cong, 1st Sess 51 (2005) (statement of Professor Jonathan Turley); James W. Ely Jr, Kelo: A Setback for Property Owners, 23
GPSolo 22, 22-23 (Sept 2006). It is clear that there was Supreme Court precedent for
Kelo, but there remains disagreement on the proper reading of the Takings Clause. See,
for example, Richard A. Epstein, Kelo: An American Original:Of Grubby Particularsand
Grand Principles,8 Green Bag 2d 355, 356 (2005).
16 Vermeule has argued in favor of such political checks over legal checks on government. See Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, The Executive Unbound: After the
MadisonianRepublic 201-02 (Oxford 2010).
17 See, for example, Richard A. Posner, Foreword:A Political Court, 119 Harv L
Rev 32, 98 (2005) (stating that, "[p]aradoxically, the strong adverse public and legislative
reactions to the Kelo decision are evidence of its pragmatic soundness," because it will
likely trigger a democratic movement to seek changes in the political system) (citation
omitted).
14
15
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complaint can be made with regard to his own discussion of risk.
In a book that is premised on real-world risks, there is relatively
little discussion of those risks or their relative importance in
governance. The book consistently keeps the discussion on a
largely theoretical, abstract level while making arguments about
ignoring the real risks inherent in governing. While some risks
are discussed in passing, the case is not made for the idea that
certain risks (such as the abuse of power) are clearly less likely
than the countervailing risks addressed by executive action. Yet,
at various points in discussing specific controversies like recess
appointments, Vermeule suggests that there are identifiably
better and worse choices on constitutional rules based on the
balancing of ill-defined risks (pp 77-78). The largely abstract
discussion of risks undermines the argument that other theories
fail to adequately deal with real versus phantom risks.
Vermeule can certainly state that he is merely advocating the
balancing of risks and not presupposing their relative strengths.
However, relying on undefined risks invites more-subjective
analysis or bias without offering a better notion of how this process actually works. When Vermeule does discuss risk, the result is more worrisome than helpful-suggesting the very selection bias that was so concerning in the definitional material.
Vermeule clearly distinguishes between risks and "normative question[s]" (p 79) but remains unclear on how to ultimately
synthesize risks and values in constitutional rulemaking. In his
later discussion on the "mature position" (p 79), he seems to
shrug off that final stage of rulemaking:
Risk regulation, whether at the first-order or second-order
level, is only a part of what societies might properly care
about; once democratic decision makers have figured out
what the optimal precautions are, there is a separate normative question about what to do, in light of that mature
risk assessment. What the mature position does exclude,
however, is a decision to depart from optimal precautions
for the wrong sort of reasons, or on spurious grounds.
Although democratic decision makers might adopt a suboptimal set of precautions, they should do so with their eyes
open, after an evenhanded assessment of both target risks
and countervailing risks, rather than in the misguided belief that a prudent approach to risk so requires. (p 79)
Whatever Vermeule might believe are the "wrong sort of reasons" (p 79), he clearly believes that the base analysis for the
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decisionmakers ought to be the balancing of risks, which is then
subject to a normative judgment on what to order. That base
analysis still excludes what could be viewed as soft variables or
at least positive values underlying such rules as the prohibition
on takings. Moreover, Vermeule's "mature position" clearly does
not exclude a decision that departs from "optimal precautions"
(p 77) (emphasis omitted), which only returns the reader to the
question of what risks can justify such a decision for the "right
sort of reasons."
Second-order risks remain relatively undefined and unranked in Vermeule's work by design. However, the Constitution
presents a wide array of protections addressing an equally wide
array of risks. For example, the Bill of Rights is necessarily
written to deter risks that would threaten due process, undermine federalism, and impede other rights. Yet these amendments were written to protect positive values like the free exercise of religion or free speech that seem exogenous in Vermeule's
analysis. It was not the risks, but rather the rights, that shaped
the language of the amendments. Of course, those risks are then
addressed in the interpretation of the constitutional provisions.
In those interpretations Vermeule occasionally tackles specific
rules, like that in Brandenburgv Ohio,18 in which the Court balanced free speech against the imminent threat of violence (p 42).
While the case has been criticized for its dangerously undefined
standard of criminal speech, 19 Vermeule sees it as a classic precautionary rule against the risk of politically motivated actions
and "other worst-case political pathologies" (p 42). The obvious
risks under the First Amendment include not just politically motivated actions but also the chilling effect that the regulation of
speech has on individuals. The countervailing interests include
the government's desire to combat disruptive, hateful, or incendiary speech.20 Vermeule often treats such precautionary rules
18 395 US 444, 447 (1969) ("[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free
press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law
violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action.").
19 See, for example, Jonathan Turley, When Is Violent Speech Still Free Speech?
(USA Today, May 2, 2005), archived at http://perma.cc/2LWB-AJAN; Jordan Strauss,
Context Is Everything. Towards a More Flexible Rule for Evaluating True Threats under
the First Amendment, 32 Sw U L Rev 231, 245 (2003) (noting that, as it stands, the
Brandenburgtest is unclear about what speech it protects).
20 See generally Jonathan Turley, Shut Up and Play Nice, Wash Post B1 (Oct 14,
2012). Notably, despite the recent massive march in Paris to support free speech following the Charlie Hebdo massacre, France has led the rollback of free speech in the West
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as based on unlikely or unrealized risks. Yet we have seen not
only repeated governmental crackdowns on free speech and the
free press but also recent examples of such efforts in the name of
combating terrorism or hate speech. These are real risks that
threaten core constitutional values. Indeed, history (including
recent history) has reaffirmed the great and growing risks that
are at the heart of these precautionary rules. That history would
seem to reaffirm strict precautionary rules. The opposing risks
cited by the government, by contrast, have been somewhat more
elusive.21 Without dealing directly with either the specific risks
on both sides or their relative strengths, it is difficult to accept
Vermeule's ultimate point-that precautionary rules are often
based on phantom risks or that we can relax precautionary rules
in the constitutional system. Given Vermeule's controversial
work on trade-offs between national security and liberty, the uncertainty increases concerns over soft variables in the analysis.22
It is not just the fact of trade-offs but how those trade-offs are
made in Vermeule's vision of constitutional rulemaking.
II. THE KNAVE AND PRECAUTIONARY CONSTITUTIONALISM
Vermeule's particular gift in addressing constitutional theories is his extraordinary ability to harmonize diverse sources
and theories into a coherent approach to the regulation of risk in
constitutions. His refashioning of prior constitutional theories
into what he calls "precautionary constitutionalism" is a significant achievement for the book (p 10) (emphasis omitted). While
he clearly seeks to achieve more than such a descriptive victory
with this book, his descriptive insights into the role of risk are a
significant contribution to the field. Vermeule offers a fascinating perspective of constitutional history and language as a dialogue over risk and its regulation. 23 He questions whether the

on the basis of combating discriminatory and degrading speech. See Jonathan Turley,
The Threat to French Free Speech Isn't Terrorism. It's the French., Wash Post B1 (Jan 11,
2015).
21
See Jonathan Turley, Criminalizing Intolerance, LA Times A23 (Dec 13, 2011);
Jonathan Turley, Undo the Stolen Valor Act to Protect Free Speech, LA Times A19 (Oct
20, 2011).
22 See notes 96-108 and accompanying text.
23 Vermeule assembles both historical and contemporary sources that reflect his
view of overcompensating for risk. The Kelo decision on takings holds an obvious appeal
in this respect, and the opinion quotes Justice James Iredell:
It is not sufficient to urge, that the power may be abused, for, such is the nature of all power,-such is the tendency of every human institution: and, it
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preoccupation with certain risks of the abuse of power is real or
worth the structural protections created to combat those risks.
Further, he seeks to dispatch the phantom risks in favor of a
system allowing greater flexibility in addressing a broader array
of risks.24
Any student of American constitutional history will attest to
the Founders' concerns over the risks of concentrated authority
in the form of tyranny and other threats to liberty. It is axiomatic that the US government's structure was designed in part to
avoid certain political risks or ills. Indeed, some of the most influential writers at the time saw those risks as a structuring
theme. For example, Hume famously maintained that, "in contriving any system of government, and and [sic] fixing the several checks and controuls of the constitution, every man ought to
be supposed a knave, and to have no other end, in all his actions,
but private interest.25 Hume's statement clearly captures
Vermeule's concept of precautionary constitutionalism and the
"knavery principle" that motivates many constitutional rulemakers (p 30). Notably, Hume was speaking of structural elements to a government that are inherent in the separation of
powers. Vermeule believes that the precautions against such
knavery can not only radically inflate the likelihood of the actual
risk but also create or ignore other risks.
Vermeule defines precautionary constitutionalism as a view
"that constitutional rules should above all entrench precautions
against the risks that official action will result in dictatorship or

might as fairly be said, that the power of taxation, which is only circumscribed
by the discretion of the Body, in which it is vested, ought not to be granted, because the Legislature, disregarding its true objects, might, for visionary and
useless projects, impose a tax to the amount of nineteen shillings in the pound.
We must be content to limit power where we can, and where we cannot, consistently with its use, we must be content to repose a salutatory confidence.
Kelo, 545 US at 487 n 19, quoting Calder v Bull, 3 US (3 Dallas) 386, 400 (1798) (Iredell
concurring). This is an observation that certainly reflects the view that the mere potential for abuse should not be sufficient reason for maximal precautionary rules. However,
the quotation is also a bit of a curiosity in the Kelo context, since many felt that a brightline rule could be drawn at the use of eminent domain for this type of private enterprise.
This was not some quibbling over the best use of taxes but rather, for many, a paradigmatic shift in takings jurisprudence. Indeed, the taking of this property confirmed for
many the continuing and real danger of abusive takings.
24
Borrowing from Samuel Johnson's The False Alarm (cited in note 4), Vermeule
decries "libertarian panics" over "the phantom of lost liberty." Book Talk at 18:50-19:04
(cited in note 1).
25 David Hume, Of the Independency of Parliament, in 1 Essays and Treatises on
Several Subjects 71, 74 (A. Miller 1760) (emphasis omitted).
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tyranny, corruption and official self-dealing, violations of the
rights of minorities, or other political harms of equivalent
severity" (p 11). Vermeule has ample historical support for
showing that those who wrote the Constitution could be called
risk averse, or at least averse to particular (and, in Vermeule's
view, overly narrow) risks. The greatest danger that the Framers sought to avoid is the concentration of power in any one
branch of government or any one person.2 6 Other risks, such as
the corrosive effect of factions, occupied some of the Framers, including (most famously) Madison.27 Vermeule sees in this record
a system designed for risk regulation. Some sources certainly
support that assessment. Robert Yates, writing as Brutus, captures the risk-averse mindset described by Vermeule in advancing his core "axiom" of constitutional drafting that "the people
should never authorize their rulers to do any thing, which if
done, would operate to their injury" (p 30).28 Vermeule shows
how this theme of risk avoidance runs through much of the discussion of the Framers and their contemporaries. However, he
argues that these writings focus on a few overriding risks with
little consideration of countervailing risks or their relative likelihood. He analogizes these risks to the concept in finance of
"fat-tail risks" or "risks that are exceedingly unlikely to materialize, but more likely than in a normal distribution, and that are
exceeding damaging if they do materialize" (p 49). Vermeule
uses the fat-tail-risk concept to capture the mindset of constitutional structures designed to avoid low-risk dangers.
Under certain types of probability distributions ("fat tail
distributions"), such risks will have an important role in the
decision-making calculus; here the crucial mistake is to assume that the relevant risk is normally distributed, such
that exceedingly damaging outcomes are effectively impossible.
In politics and law, by analogy, we might understand
precautionary constitutionalists and maximin constitutionalists[29]
26 See Jonathan Turley, Recess Appointments in the Age of Regulation, 93 BU L Rev
1523, 1536 (2013) ("Both federalists and antifederalists alike referred to the separation
of powers in similar, antiaggregation terms.").
27 See Jonathan Turley, Senate Trials and Factional Disputes: Impeachment as a
MadisonianDevice, 49 Duke L J 1, 109-17 (1999).
28 Quoting Essays of Brutus, in Herbert J. Storing and Murray Dry, eds, 2 The
Complete Anti-Federalist358, 406 (Chicago 1981).
29 Vermeule uses the term "constitutional maximin" to describe the position of Professor Vincent Blasi, who urges adopting a "pathological perspective" toward constitu-
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as alert to the possibility of fat-tail distributions of political
outcomes. The risk that a constitutional democracy might
suddenly slide into dictatorship, for example, is exceedingly
remote, but such an event might also be exceedingly harmful to constitutional values if it did occur. (p 49)
Past scholarship has discussed such risks in terms of "black
swan" risks and uncertainty principles. 30 Black swans are rare
events that tend to fall outside the bell-shaped curves of probabilities. 31 We have learned from painful experience, including the
recent 2008 financial crisis, that the failure to prepare for black
swans can be devastating.32 However, Vermeule views fat-tail
risks generally as distorting constitutional rulemaking.
Obviously, one has to accept Vermeule's construct that it is
risk that defines this approach and that risk regulation can be
used to measure the success of precautionary constitutionalism.
The suggestion that risk avoidance is at the heart of many
statements of the Framers is hardly surprising. All governmental structures are designed to not only achieve positive outcomes
but also avoid negative outcomes. However, Vermeule moves the
conceptual ball in his application of risk theory to constitutional
structure. He explores the manifestation of this approach in a
variety of areas, including the unitary executive, separation of
powers, standing armies, the Bill of Rights, and presidential
power. He insists that, while there are precautionary rationales
that are applicable throughout the development of constitutional
rules, "framers, judges, and other actors have attempted to undermine the arguments for precaution" (p 53).
Vermeule presents these arguments along the categorical
lines of Hirschman's The Rhetoric of Reaction (p 52).33 Vermeule
attempts to show how precautionary constitutional systems are
exposed as inherently flawed when seen through the lens of

tional risk aversion in areas like the First Amendment (p 41), quoting Vincent Blasi, The
PathologicalPerspectiveand the First Amendment, 85 Colum L Rev 449, 449-50 (1985).
30 Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable
272 (Random House 2007) (drawing a distinction between planning for "known unknowns" and "unknown unknowns").
31
Id at xvii-xix.
32 See David A. Skeel Jr, States of Bankruptcy, 79 U Chi L Rev 677, 704 (2012);
Brian J.M. Quinn, The Failure of Private Ordering and the FinancialCrisis of 2008, 5
NYU J L & Bus 549, 549 (2009).
33 Hirschman, The Rhetoric of Reaction at 7 (cited in note 9). This discussion appears in the chapter in which Vermeule describes his theory of optimizing constitutionalism but is directed primarily at showing the flaws in precautionary constitutionalism.
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theories of futility, jeopardy, perversity, and ex post remedies.
However, it is here that Vermeule's underdeveloped notion of
risk takes its toll. Indeed, while making compelling points that
the "pathological" approach to risk in areas like the First
Amendment is poorly defined, Vermeule seems to offer little
more definition in this description of countervailing risks, which
are given passing reference and no sense of relative weight (or
any notion of how to weigh such countervailing risks).
At the outset, the use of Hirschman's theses is a curious
choice, since Hirschman identified these standard arguments as
used by reactionary thinkers to fight reforms and redirect public
debates. Hirschman then advanced more-progressive narratives,
which Vermeule also incorporates in his Hirschmanian mature
position (p 53).34 In this way, Vermeule continues to reference
arguments of perversity, futility, and jeopardy as flaws in precautionary systems while arguing for a mature position (his optimizing-constitutionalism theory) based on those narratives.
Hirschman's point was that these arguments are common but
unconvincing rhetorical devices used to oppose reform. Accordingly, for those who read Hirschman in this way, Vermeule's use
of the categories reads like reactionary narratives (perversity,
futility, and jeopardy) succeeding in proving a progressive narrative (the mature position). Vermeule does ultimately adopt the
mature position, albeit with continued references to Hirschman's reactionary narratives. 31 In fairness to Vermeule,
34 This position was originally propounded by Hirschman in contrast to many of the
reactionary narratives:

(1) There are dangers and risks in both action and inaction. The risks of both
should be canvassed, assessed, and guarded against to the extent possible.
(2) The baneful consequences of either action or inaction can never be known
with the certainty affected by the two types of alarm-sounding Cassandras
with whom we have become acquainted. When it comes to forecasts of impending mishaps or disasters, it is well to remember the saying Le pire n'est pas
toujours sar-the worst is not always sure (to happen).
Id at 153-54. In Vermeule's book, the reference to the "two types of alarm-sounding
Cassandras" is omitted, but it is notable that this is a reference in part to the jeopardy
thesis. Thus, this and the other "reactionary" narratives are not reconciled with the mature position in Hirschman's work to the extent that they seem to be reconciled in
Vermeule's work. Id at 149.
35 In his later articulation of the virtues of optimizing constitutionalism, Vermeule
allies himself with critics following these narratives:
[Als I have [ ] tried to show, an equally venerable and impressive line of critics
... have criticized precautionary constitutionalism root and branch. Three
main lines of criticism stand out: arguments based on futility, jeopardy, and
perversity. In some cases constitutional precautions will fail the test of
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Hirschman himself acknowledged that "[t]hese arguments are
not, of course, the exclusive property of 'reactionaries.' They can
be invoked by any group that opposes or criticizes new policy
proposals or newly enacted policies." 36 In this case, Vermeule
uses the arguments to oppose not a new idea but long-standing
37
constitutional values.
The more serious concern is that Vermeule's arguments
against precautionary constitutionalism contain some of the
same flaws identified by Hirschman in the rhetoric against reform.38 Vermeule's arguments are often based on generalizations
that take ideas like the uncertainty principle and elevate the
possible to equal footing with the likely (as with the perversity
narrative).9 The value of these narratives is what Hirschman
referred to as their "disarmingly simple" structure. 40 They are
often used to contest limitations on government power, or even
in some prior writings, democracy itself.41 Hirschman's critique
is relevant to Vermeule's work in the degree to which these arguments are presented with sweeping generalities and assumptions. This is not to say that Vermeule cannot convert these

incentive-incompatibility, failing to stick when the risks they seek to prevent
materialize, perhaps because those very risks have materialized. In some cases
precautions, although sensible in themselves, will prove too costly on other
margins, and thus fail a kind of rough calculus of costs and benefits.
(pp 186-87)
36
Hirschman, Rhetoric of Reaction at 7 (cited in note 9).
37 This criticism is not meant to paint Vermeule as a reactionary. However, the use
of these categories to challenge Madison's precautionary rules is notable given
Vermeule's general acceptance of the rise of a type of uberpresidency in the United
States. His arguments in prior work that question the legal limits on presidential power
(and his criticism of arguments concerning civil liberties during national emergencies)
would likely have been seen as reactionary at the time, though he clearly would not have
been alone in holding such views. See notes 103-06 and accompanying text. See also
Hirschman, Rhetoric of Reaction at 12-14 (cited in note 9). Indeed, Benjamin Franklin's
famous warning bears out that such trade-offs were openly discussed at the time of the
Founding: 'They who can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety." Benjamin Franklin, 1 Memoirs of the Life and Writings
of Benjamin Franklin517 (Henry Colburn 1818).
38 Indeed, these very arguments could well have been made at the Founding by
those who resisted the executive powers of the English monarchy. Hirschman traced
these arguments to contemporaries of the Framers in the French Revolution. See
Hirschman, Rhetoric of Reaction at 12-13 (cited in note 9).
39 Hirschman was particularly scathing with regard to the perversity thesis, which
he described as having "a certain elementary sophistication and paradoxical quality that
carry conviction for those who are in search of instant insights and utter certainties." Id
at 43.
40 Id (referring to the futility thesis).
41 See id at 103-05 (discussing the jeopardy thesis).
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categories into support for his mature position, but that case is
not made in the course of his book.
A. Futility
The first critique of precautionary constitutionalism is that
it will simply fail to attain its end (p 54).42 At the heart of this
critique are what Vermeule characterizes as "parchment barriers" (pp 54-55)-a term that appears in Madison's Federalist
4843-in his argument (extending to Federalist 47, 48, and 51)
that tyranny requires the application of "auxiliary precautions."44 These include the checks and balances designed to allow
"ambition ... [to] counteract ambition. 45 Vermeule, however, is
more drawn to the prior use of the term by Alexander Hamilton
in Federalist 25, in the context of the strong opposition to stand-

ing armies (p

55).46

The Anti-Federalist opposition to standing

armies (to which Hamilton had written his retort) proved "unnecessary" in Vermeule's view because "standing armies did not
become a regular feature of the federal establishment until after
the Civil War" (p 55). It is an odd example, since the prohibition
on standing armies was not adopted and Vermeule ignores
earlier examples of abuses by the early Army under the Federalists, who seemed to realize the very risks that motivated the Anti-Federalist objections. 47 Certainly the argument can be characterized as a futility claim, but that recharacterization into risk
terminology does not clearly counter precautionary arguments.
The second example of futility is drawn from what Vermeule
discusses as the pathological approach to free speech and focuses
on Brandenburg,another curious choice since the Brandenburg
test has been criticized precisely because it is maddeningly fluid
and seen by free speech advocates as more passive-aggressive
42 Hirschman described this futility narrative in the following way: "The appeal of
the arguments rests largely on the remarkable feat of contradicting, often with obvious
relish, the commonsense understanding of these events as replete with upheaval,
change, or real reform." Hirschman, Rhetoric of Reaction at 70 (cited in note 9).
43 Federalist 48 (Madison), in The Federalist 332, 332-33 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob
E. Cooke, ed) ('Will it be sufficient to mark with precision the boundaries of these departments in the Constitution of the government, and to trust to these parchment barriers against the encroaching spirit of power?").
44 Federalist 51 (Madison), in The Federalist347, 349 (cited in note 43).
45 Id.
46 See Federalist 25 (Hamilton), in The Federalist158, 163 (cited in note 43).
47 See Jonathan Turley, The Military Pocket Republic, 97 Nw U L Rev 1, 28-30
(2002) (describing the scandals of the "New Army" established by the Constitution and
the political pressure on President Thomas Jefferson to reduce its size).

2015]

A Fox in the Hedges

than pathological. Yet Vermeule notes that "precautions will
systematically tend to prove futile when they would prevent
government from taking action against apparently dangerous
threats" (p 57). But what are the "apparent" threats that
Vermeule is referencing? Moreover, how do we evaluate the futility of the precautions without addressing the historical threat
to free speech, as shown in cases like Brandenburg,or the illdefined threats that occupy the universe of unaddressed
countervailing risks?
While Vermeule raises the issue of the futility of some free
speech protections, these questions seem lost in the ether of his
theory that precautionary safeguards can prove futile. In this final example of clear-statement rules, we are left with the same
uncertainty. Vermeule notes the requirement that presidential
actions have "clear statutory authorization," but he suggests
that this precautionary rule commonly fails due to the unreliability of courts (p 57). He notes that the requirement can be
"swept away by the sense of crisis," and that "clear-statement
restrictions on presidential emergency powers and war powers
suffer from severe commitment problems" (p 57). Yet it is not
clear how this is a failure of precautionary constitutionalism,
since optimizing constitutionalism would run into the same
commitment problems in limiting executive excess in times of
crisis. I certainly agree that courts have a perfectly dismal record of maintaining a consistent or principled line of cases during
wars and national crises. However, Vermeule seems to suggest
that the failure of judicial integrity and consistency during such
periods shows the futility of such rules. This assertion is akin to
saying that the occurrence of impeachable conduct by presidents
shows the futility of rules against such conduct. Under such an
argument, any precautionary rule is challengeable as futile due
to the frailty of human agents. It is not clear where the futility
argument leaves the ultimate analysis. Futility arguments are
compelling on narrow, insular risk-management questions.
However, when applied more broadly to a constitutional context,
it is difficult to extrapolate a wider meaning of a failure of clearstatement rules to constitutional rulemaking as a whole.
B.

Jeopardy

The second critique of precautionary constitutionalism is
that a given precaution "will produce net costs in light of countervailing risks on other margins" (p 54). Vermeule explains that
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past critics of rulemaking advanced classic jeopardy arguments
against precautionary theories. 4a Again, Vermeule uses Hamilton's arguments opposing a prohibition on standing armies as
illustrative. He notes that Hamilton suggested that the prohibition "would create a countervailing risk on a different marginthe seizure of property by foreign invaders-and that it would
perversely create a risk to liberty itself, because a foreign invasion would destroy liberty as surely as would domestic
despotism" (p 58).
Vermeule's use of recess appointments as an example of
jeopardy is a bit more forced and less compelling-though there
is no question that supporters of the appointment power did argue countervailing risks. Vermeule discusses the recent case of
Noel Canning v National Labor Relations Board,49 in which
President Barack Obama was found to have violated the separation of powers by making recess appointments during an intrasession recess of Congress.50 In the interest of full disclosure,
Vermeule and I sharply differ on the merits of this case. 51
Vermeule's discussion focuses on the opinion of the DC Circuit
since the book came out before the Supreme Court ruled unanimously to uphold the decision (and agreed that the president's

48

Again, Hirschman is illustrative in his description of the thesis from his work:

The jeopardy thesis draws considerable strength from its connections with []
various myths and stereotypes. The argument that a new advance will imperil
an older one is somehow immediately plausible, as is the idea that an ancient
liberty is bound to be more valuable or fundamental than a new ("newfangled")
one.
Hirschman, Rhetoric of Reaction at 123 (cited in note 9).
49 705 F3d 490 (DC Cir 2013), affd, 134 S Ct 2550 (2014).
50 Noel Canning, 705 F3d at 503-04. I testified in the congressional hearing held
after the recess appointments and argued that the appointments were flagrantly unconstitutional-admittedly raising many precautionary themes that Vermeule identifies.
See Executive Overreach: The President's Unprecedented 'Recess"Appointments, Hearing
before the Committee on the Judiciary,House of Representatives, 112th Cong, 2d Sess 35-

57 (2012) (statement of Professor Jonathan Turley) ("Executive Overreach"). See generally ConfirmationHearing for Attorney General Nominee Loretta Lynch before the Senate

Committee on the Judiciary (Jan 29, 2015) (statement of Professor Jonathan Turley)
("Lynch Hearing"), archived at http://perma.cc/G2KU-96QP (discussing the Noel Can-

ning decision and the role of confirmation hearings to reinforce the separation of
powers).
51

Compare Adrian Vermeule, Recess Appointments and Precautionary Constitu-

tionalism, 126 Harv L Rev F 122 (2013), with Turley, 93 BU L Rev 1523 (cited in note
26). See also Jonathan Turley, ConstitutionalAdverse Possession: Recess Appointments
and the Role of HistoricalPractice in ConstitutionalInterpretation,2013 Wis L Rev 965,

1016 n 308, 1029.
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recess appointments had violated the Constitution).52 Vermeule
uses the argument raised (by himself and others) in favor of the
appointments as an example of jeopardy reasoning.53 Vermeule
criticizes the exclusive focus on the "senatorial check on appointments" that relegates to the background the critical truth
that "[a]ll provisions of the Constitution, and indeed the document's very existence, implicitly presuppose that a functioning
government is a worthy aim of constitutional interpretation"
(p 60). The argument certainly captures the ever-present countervailing risks that can be made in a jeopardy argument, but it
also highlights the subjectivity of such risks.
The suggestion that the risk avoided by such recess appointments is the very functioning of government, or even a
component of government, is manifestly overblown. The actual
number of appointments controversies remains relatively small
among federal offices and, when such controversies arise, there
are acting officials who carry out the work of the agencies. The
NLRB vacancy at issue in Noel Canning did present an operational barrier since there was a need to satisfy a quorum rule,
which is why the confirmation was withheld pending resolutions
4
with Congress over the funding and function of the board.6
However, the vast majority of recess appointments lead to the
work being done by an acting official,55 which, while hardly optimal, is hardly catastrophic for that agency or office. The
treatment of the risks as commensurate exposes the limitations
of risk analysis as the basis for a unified theory of constitutional
rulemaking. To simply point out that there are countervailing
National Labor Relations Board v Noel Canning,134 S Ct 2550, 2578 (2014).
Vermeule also raises the filibuster rule as contributing to this danger and insists
that "no problem would occur" if the Senate were to simply eliminate the rule (p 60). It is
not clear why Vermeule thinks that there would be no problem on appointments with a
majority-voting system. Various presidents have found themselves facing a hostile majority in the Senate when no filibuster was needed. They have used the recess appointment power to circumvent such majorities in the past. Moreover, the filibuster rule is
simply a rule of the Senate passed by majority vote. It was recently curtailed by majority
vote. Paul Kane, Reid, Democrats Trigger "Nuclear"Option; Eliminate Most Filibusters
on Nominees (Wash Post, Nov 21, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/G55D-Y9VX. An argument could be made in favor of filibuster rules in light of the shrinking influence of
Congress over agencies and the use of appointments to seek information and changes on
regulatory matters. See Turley, 93 BU L Rev at 1557-61 (cited in note 26).
54 See Steven Greenhouse, Labor Panel Is Stalled by Dispute on Nominee, NY
Times A16 (Jan 15, 2010).
55 See Anne Joseph O'Connell, Vacant Offices: Delays in Staffing Top Agency Positions, 82 S Cal L Rev 913, 933 (2009) ("For the most critical positions, there is a default
acting official.").
52
53
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risks is not enough. It is difficult to conclude that precautionary
rules are vulnerable to the jeopardy argument without a firm
understanding of the relative value of the risks and their ability
to be addressed in other ways.
C.

Perversity

Vermeule's third critique of precautionary constitutionalism
is that a given precaution can prove self-defeating by exacerbating "the very risk that the precaution attempts to prevent"
(p 54). Again, Vermeule is able to show how critics of precautionary constitutionalism, including some from the Founding, at
56
times referred to what would be called perversity arguments.
For example, Vermeule again cites Hamilton's views concerning
limiting executive powers. The heavy reliance on Hamilton undermines the view that such arguments were common, but it
does certainly offer an illustrative example of how such an argument can be made. Hamilton argued that placing significant
limitations on executive power could produce the very danger
that one was seeking to avoid by encouraging frustrated executives to simply break from all constitutional limitations. 57 It is a
weak example of perversity since the danger is of an act against
the Constitution as a whole and presumably is an impeachable
offense. President Richard Nixon's actions were certainly the
very risk that was sought to be avoided, but so are the acts of
every felon that violate a standard of conduct. To suggest that
limitations on an executive somehow force an unconstitutional
act is uncompelling as an example.
The general weakness of the perversity arguments overall is
further evident in Vermeule's resumption of the discussion of recess appointments. Vermeule's suggestion of a perverse incentive is remarkably forced in this context. In discussing the DC
Circuit's ruling, which was designed to avoid presidential aggrandizement, Vermeule notes:

56 Hirschman identified the perversity thesis as a reactionary argument based on
market economics-that "any public policy aiming to change market outcomes, such as
prices or wages, automatically becomes noxious interference with beneficent equilibrating processes." Hirschman, Rhetoric of Reaction at 27 (cited in note 9).
57 This specific paper was actually a collaboration between Madison and Hamilton.
Federalist 20 (Madison and Hamilton), in The Federalist 124, 127 (cited in note 43) ("A
weak constitution must necessarily terminate in dissolution, for want of proper powers,
or the usurpation of powers requisite for the public safety.').
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That holding might actually turn out to be perverse, making
matters worse on the very same margin the court was worried about. In other words, the court's precaution against
president aggrandizement might actually increase the overall risk of aggrandizement in the long run.
How would this occur? The main mechanism involves
the risk of backlash. Suppose ...the president offers some
radical reinterpretation of the Constitution, one that gives
him substantially increased discretion over appointments.
...Should the new position stick as a political equilibrium,
then-given the Canning court's own concern with safeguards against presidential power-the court might bitterly
regret, ex post, that it threw up an obstruction that contributed to creating a backlash in the other direction. (p 67)
Again, the perversity risk is that a president will act in contravention of the Constitution. However, since the Court ruled on
the most recent violation in this area, it would be free to address
this risk of a "radical reinterpretation" in another such corrective decision without being paralyzed with "bitter[] regret"
(p 67).
A third example in the free speech context is more compelling. Vermeule discusses Justice Robert Jackson's dissent in
Terminiello v Chicago.5 Jackson raises a classic perversity argument in challenging the majority's ruling to protect the speech
of a defrocked Catholic priest against a breach of the peace
charge. 59 Jackson advances a signature specter that too much
freedom might lead to less freedom-a position left characteristically in highly generalized terms:
In the long run, maintenance of free speech will be more endangered if the population can have no protection from the
abuses which lead to violence. No liberty is made more
secure by holding that its abuses are inseparable from its
enjoyment. We must not forget that it is the free democratic

337 US 1 (1949).
59 Vermeule cites Justices Jackson and Felix Frankfurter elsewhere in the book as
leading voices against precautionary constitutionalism (p 20). They are telling choices for
those of us who have long been highly critical of these jurists, particularly Frankfurter.
Frankfurter's fluid and often inconsistent views on legal questions were matched only by
his lack of ethics in cases like Ex Parte Quirin, 317 US 1 (1942). See Jonathan Turley,
Tribunals and Tribulations: The Antithetical Elements of Military Governance in a
Madisonian Democracy, 70 Geo Wash L Rev 649, 737-45 (2002); Jonathan Turley,
Quirin Revisited: The Dark History of a Military Tribunal, Natl L J A20 (Oct 28, 2002).
58
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communities that ask us to trust them to maintain peace
with liberty and that the factions engaged in this battle
[with Fascists and Communists] are not interested permanently in either.60
That is clearly an example of a perversity argument, and the
question is why it should be given credence. Certainly it is not
credited by Hirschman for the very reasons that are apparent
here. 61 Jackson was making a sweeping and unsupported suggestion that allowing speech would ultimately threaten the very
existence of the system. Vermeule refers to this as the danger
created by "tolerating political speech and participation by
groups who would repeal liberal protections if they came to power" (p 69). Of course, a "repeal" of such liberties would require
changing the First Amendment itself. More importantly, history
has shown that it is the denial, not the protection, of free speech
that is the harbinger of authoritarianism.62 Putting aside the
merits of such long-standing debates, Vermeule does isolate a
good example of a perversity argument, but the reader is left to
question what, beyond classification, such an example achieves
for constitutional analysis-a question that only grows with consideration of Vermeule's optimizing-constitutionalism concept.
D.

Ex Post Remedies

The final critique is that risks are best addressed not with a
general ex ante precaution but with "an ex post remedy applied
case-by-case, after the relevant risk has actually materialized"
(p 54). Vermeule gives various examples of instances in which
critics have charged that the availability of ex post remedies reduces the necessity of ex ante precautions. Vermeule quotes Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's dissent in Panhandle Oil Co v
Mississippi,63 in which he voted to uphold a state sales tax on oil
sold to the United States (p 73). Holmes insisted that the danger
raised by such taxes is addressed by the Court itself and that
"the power to tax is not the power to destroy while this Court
Terminiello, 337 US at 36-37 (Jackson dissenting).
See Hirschman, Rhetoric of Reaction at 36, 39-42 (cited in note 9) ("[I]t can be
argued that the perverse effect, which appears to be a mere variant of the concept of unintended consequences, is in one important respect its denial and even betrayal.").
62 See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in FirstAmendment Theory, 1977 Am Bar
Found Rsrch J 521, 527 (describing how free speech can protect against abuses of official
power).
63 277 US 218 (1928).
60
61
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sits."64 It is a strong sentiment that a precautionary rule might
not be needed given the availability of judicial review. Ironically,
it is also the obvious answer to Vermeule's perversity argument
on recess appointments discussed above.
Vermeule uses Holmes's famous line to highlight the champion of ex post remedies: Frankfurter. Frankfurter wrote the
controversial majority opinion in Beauharnais v Illinois,65 in
which the Court upheld a clear constraint on free speech in the
hope that such restrictions might reduce social tensions.66
Frankfurter showed his classic disregard for precautionary values, casting them aside on the possibility that circumscribing
free speech might succeed:
In the face of this history and its frequent obligato of extreme racial and religious propaganda, we would deny experience to say that the Illinois legislature was without reason
in seeking ways to curb false or malicious defamation of racial and religious groups, made in public places and by
means calculated to have a powerful emotional impact on
those to whom it was presented.67
In a telling passage, however, Frankfurter did not trouble himself with the relative weight of the threat of free speech or even
the likely success of the constraint on free speech in curtailing
unrest:
It may be argued, and weightily, that this legislation will
not help matters; that tension and on occasion violence between racial and religious groups must be traced to causes
more deeply embedded in our society than the rantings of
modern Know-Nothings. Only those lacking responsible
humility will have a confident solution for problems as intractable as the frictions attributable to differences of race,
color or religion. This being so, it would be out of bounds for
the judiciary to deny the legislature a choice of policy, provided it is not unrelated to the problem and not forbidden by
some explicit limitation on the State's power. That the legislative remedy might not in practice mitigate the evil, or
might itself raise new problems, would only manifest once
more the paradox of reform. It is the price to be paid for the
64
65
66
67

Id at 223 (Holmes dissenting).
343 US 250 (1952).
See id at 251-52, 266-67.
Id at 261.
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trial-and-error inherent in legislative efforts to deal with
obstinate social issues.68
Thus, Frankfurter was not simply arguing for ex post remedies; he was articulating a largely undefined concept of-and a
low level of protection for-free speech that requires only that
restrictions not be "unrelated to the problem."69 This captures
much of the problem with Vermeule's analysis. The problem is
not simply the relative weight of risks and counterrisks, but the
focus on risks as opposed to the inherent value of what is being
protected. Frankfurter's words reflect a minimalist understanding of the value of free speech itself and its role in society, a
problem that will be discussed more fully below.

III. THE PHANTOM AND OPTIMIZING CONSTITUTIONALISM
Despite my criticism of some of Vermeule's assumptions, his
examination of constitutional rulemaking through the lens of
risk analysis is still fascinating and a clear contribution to the
field. However, to achieve his second proposition of a new unifying theory of constitutional law, Vermeule has to use this risk
concept as a foundation, not merely as a new descriptive element in constitutional analysis. In doing so, the problem of illdefined risks becomes magnified. There remains a threshold
question of the focus on the risk as opposed to the object of the
risk, such as free speech or free exercise. It is with this new
theory that the fox gets a bit hedgehog-like, but never really
seems to stop being a fox that knows many things yet lacks that
one viable big theory.
A.

The Mature Position and the Vermeulean Virtues

Vermeule does not subscribe to all the risk critiques-or arguments against all precautionary measures-but rather adopts
what he refers to as the "mature position" of constitutional risk
regulation (p 76). This is another adoption from Hirschman's
work, which seeks to find a compromise between the "risks in
both action and inaction. 70 Central to Hirschman's mature position is the saying Le pire n'est pas toujours sdr-the worst is not
always sure to happen.71 That saying captures the general
68 Id at 261-62 (citation omitted).
69 Beauharnais,343 US at 262.
70 Hirschman, Rhetoric of Reaction at 153 (cited in note 9).
71 See id at 154.
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suspicion of bright-line precautionary rules, which is amplified
by Vermeule:
The mature position is structurally parallel, in the domain
of political risks, to the position advanced by critics of precautionary principles in health, safety, and environmental
regulation. On this view, given the possibility of countervailing risks, the goal of the designer of a regulatory system
should be optimal precautions rather than maximal precautions. The latter is an incoherent goal in any event, because
precautions may themselves create risks, and thereby prove
self-defeating. The mature calculus, then, posits that
"[o]ptimal regulation in the face of a target risk (TR) and a
countervailing risk (CR) would take both seriously and
strive to maximize their difference (ATR-ACR). Uncertainty
is not the crucial problem-trade-offs are." (p 77) (quotation
marks omitted).
Vermeule warns of the costs that come with seeking to prevent phantom risks 72 since "precautions against unforeseen consequences can themselves bring about other unforeseen consequences" (p 105).73 Such phantom risks are at the heart of what
Vermeule calls the "self-defeating" precautions of the Framers
(p 105). Indeed, he views some attempts to avoid risks as the
very thing undermining the system as a whole: "Attempting to
skew the constitutional rules to safeguard against the unforeseen may be precisely what brings the unforeseen about"
(p 106). Vermeule argues that "optimal risk assessment" is preferable to the type of large-scale precautionary systems put into
place by the Framers (p 106).
In application, optimizing constitutionalism proves highly
fluid by design.74 In what Vermeule would ultimately call
Book Talk at 19:02 (cited in note 1).
This is part of two basic conclusions based on the work of James Bryce. See generally James Bryce, 1 The American Commonwealth (Liberty Fund 3d ed 1995); James
Bryce, 2 The American Commonwealth (Liberty Fund 3d ed 1995).
74 Vermeule's view of applied theory is remarkably theoretical for those seeking a
path through intractable contemporary controversies. For example, he applies this theory to such controversies as the risks associated with the goal of impartiality, in addition
to challenging the legal maxim nemo iudex in sua causa-no man should be judge in his
own case or cause (p 107). Vermeule argues that, despite the general acceptance of this
principle, "as a normative matter, impartiality is a good to be optimized, not maximized;
and as a positive matter, U.S. constitutional law surprisingly often abandons the ideal of
impartiality in favor of other goods" (p 107). From legislator qualifications to questions of
court jurisdiction, Vermeule spends considerable effort showing that this is not treated
72

73
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"[c]onstitutional [r]ulemaking [w]ithout a [s]tyle," he eschews
robust precautionary rules in favor of a balancing approach that
often deals with problems ex post (pp 186-87). He rejects the
approach of writers like Hume and Madison in favor of the more
fluid approach of people like Hamilton, Jackson, and
Frankfurter. Those associations lead inexorably toward what
most would recognize as a more functionalist approach to conflict, though it is based on Vermeule's desire for optimal risk assessment. From Vermeule's perspective, evidence of such optimizing compromises is already seen in many institutions.
Rather than adopt, for example, the absolute expression of impartiality rules, Vermeule notes that the Constitution contains a
series of trade-offs that give governmental entities some power
over their own conditions, while checking that authority in other
respects. It is evidence of optimizing compromises that Vermeule
suggests can be applied more broadly in breaking away from
some precautionary rules. Vermeule also applies these optimizing principles to the mechanisms for seeking "second opinions"
that are based on a belief that such second looks allow for better
policies and decisionmaking (p 161). However, Vermeule notes
that "additional layers of deliberation and procedure are never
costless or risk-free" (p 141). They require trade-offs and can
create "jeopardy problems, if the direct costs and opportunity
costs of additional opinion outweigh their benefits" (p 161).
Much of the application of optimizing principles to notions of
impartiality and second-opinion rules is unlikely to be particularly surprising for many readers as examples of how political
risks are managed. For that reason, chapter 6 seems a more
promising context for applied theory when Vermeule turns to
the administrative state. The rise of administrative agenciesoften referred to as the "fourth branch" of government-has
alarmed some of us in the field. 75 There is a growing concern
as an absolute rule. It certainly shows a trade-off against institutional self-dealing, but it
is also far removed from the central and defining issues that usually shape major constitutional theories. It is a return to the micro- (and, one might say, foxy) focus that characterizes the book as a whole.
75 See, for example, Jonathan Turley, The Rise of the Fourth Branch, Wash Post B1
(May 26, 2013). See also Peter B. McCutchen, Mistakes, Precedent, and the Rise of the
Administrative State: Toward a Constitutional Theory of the Second Best, 80 Cornell L
Rev 1, 2-4 (1994) (acknowledging that "[t]here is no room for a fourth branch [constitutionally]," but advocating a modified formalist approach as a "second best" option); Peter
L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth
Branch, 84 Colum L Rev 573, 574-81 (1984); Lynch Hearing (cited in note 50) (discussing the threat of the fourth branch of government to the system of the separation of
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that the center of gravity within the tripartite system has shifted due to the rise of federal agencies-allowing the circumvention of political processes designed to forge majoritarian compromises and democratic accountability.6 Vermeule briefly
describes this controversy over the administrative state since
the enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act 77 as the
"perpetual conflict structured by congressional statutes and the
oversight of congressional committees, on the one hand, and
presidential policies and White House oversight, on the other"
(p 163). This is a particularly useful context for understanding
Vermeule's approach since it deals more broadly with the constitutional structure and values underlying the separation of powers-the very type of large-scale precautionary questions that
occupy many big theories. However, the fox again appears in the
hedges as Vermeule turns the analysis to a more insular question of the conflict between agency decisionmaking and expert
opinions or consensus (p 165). While the discussion of first-order
and second-order reasons is an interesting debate over administrative decisionmaking, the discussion again leaves the reader
straining to see the forest around the carefully analyzed, detailed texture of this tree.
In the end, the reader is left with a list of three "virtues" as
guides for Vermeule's "[c]onstitutional [r]ulemaking [w]ithout a
[s]tyle" (p 186). While he is again clear in his rejection of precautionary rulemaking and its "redundant and robust safeguards
against the risks [of abuse of power]" (p 186), one virtue that
Vermeule does not advance is clarity for the application of his
optimizing constitutionalism. Consider the three virtues that he
does advance:
Avoidance of political obsession. Vermeule admits that his
first Vermeulean "virtue" "verges on the banal": "constitutional
rulemakers should have no obsessions" (p 188) (emphasis omitted). In other words, rulemakers should not be obsessed with the
risks underlying classic precautionary rules and should instead
"assess all political risks for what they are worth, no more and
no less" (p 188).

powers); The President's Constitutional Duty to Faithfully Execute the Laws, House
Committee on the Judiciary (Dec 2, 2013) (statement of Jonathan Turley), archived at
http://perma.cc/Z26Z-R38E (discussing nonenforcement issues and the rise of the fourth
branch).
76 See, for example, McCutchen, 80 Cornell L Rev at 2 (cited in note 75).
77
Pub L No 79-404, 60 Stat 237 (1946), codified at 5 USC §§ 551-59.
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Avoidance of extremes. The next virtue that Vermeule identifies is that "it is generally a good idea to avoid extreme solutions" (p 188). Again, the importance or applicability of this virtue is hard to track in Vermeule's analysis, which stresses that
"[t]his is not a conceptual point, nor is it a systematic commitment; instead it is an entirely pragmatic observation that will
sometimes hold, and sometimes not, and that is based entirely
on a rough empirical judgment about the recurring circumstances of constitution-making" (p 189).
Flexibility. The final Vermeulean virtue is that rulemakers
must embrace "a wide range of commitments and allocations of
institutional authority" (p 189). Vermeule calls for balance and
maturity in decisionmaking such that rulemakers "approach
their task, to the extent possible, without preconceptions and
without biases in favor of particular institutional arrangements"
(p 190).
For many, such virtues are likely to appear as little more
than truisms. They seem to flow from Vermeule's uncola cache
as a theorist. In the end, it is not clear whether such virtues are
the demonstration of a "constitutional theory without style" or a
"style without constitutional theory." The applied material remains mostly on a very theoretical level for those readers interested in seeing how a risk-based theory would be manifested in
actual interpretative decisions. The discussion of recess appointments (at the end of Part I), however, offers such a concrete
example-the Supreme Court's decision could be viewed as supporting one aspect of Vermeule's mature-position approach to
risk.
B.

The Mature Position Applied

The tension seen in recent years over the lines of separation
of powers in our system naturally pulls a reader to those parts of
the book that address the application of Vermeule's virtues.
There is a particular interest in seeing this approach played out
in the context of higher-order risks than the prior discussion of
the costs and benefits associated with "second opinions" or "impartiality" rules. Vermeule illustrates this mature position by
returning to recess appointments and the Noel Canning decision. Vermeule takes as self-evident that his prior discussion
demonstrated that the ruling "created countervailing risks and
harms" (p 77). That result was less than evident to this reader
since those risks and harms seemed entirely undefined, unlikely,
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and unquantifiable (such as the risk of a president adopting
some novel aggrandizing theory of the Constitution). Since the
Supreme Court's decision partially supports the outcome advocated by the mature position that Vermeule articulates, the decision offers a useful context in which to explore the theory. In
application, the Vermeulean virtues seem to have the same effect as Professor Alexander Bickel's "passive virtues": to support
a more minimalist role for the courts in major constitutional
conflicts. 7s Recess appointments present a microcosm not only of
the ascension of such virtues, but also of an examination of the
foundation for a broader theory from Vermeule's risk-regulation
perspective.
As noted earlier, Vermeule is a critic of the DC Circuit decision in Noel Canning as shaped by the type of precautionary
rules that he critiques in the book. Vermeule, however, offers an
application of his theory on constitutionalism in anticipation of
the Supreme Court decision, which ultimately upheld the DC
Circuit's ruling but adopted a narrower basis for determining
that President Obama had violated the separation of powers.
The case involved Noel Canning, a bottler and distributor of
soda products, which was subject to the regulations governing
employers under the National Labor Relations Act. 79 Noel Canning challenged a negative National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) ruling issued by officials who had been appointed by
Obama during a brief break of Congress of only a few days.80 The
DC Circuit held that the appointments violated the separation of
powers and sought to blur the lines of authority in this critical
area of checks and balances: "To adopt the [government's] proffered intrasession interpretation of 'the Recess' would wholly defeat the purpose of the Framers in the careful separation of
powers structure . . . . Allowing the President to define the scope
of his own appointments power would eviscerate the Constitution's separation of powers."81
For Vermeule, the case represents a classic opportunity to
apply optimizing constitutionalism to balance all risks from both
the appointments as well as the failure of the Senate to approve
nominees for federal offices. Vermeule charges that the DC
Alexander M. Bickel, The Least DangerousBranch 199-200 (Yale 1962).
79 Pub L No 74-198, 49 Stat 449 (1935), codified at 29 USC §§ 151-69. See also Noel
Canning, 705 F3d at 498.
80 Noel Canning, 705 F3d at 499.
81 Id at 503-04.
78
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Circuit "barred all intrasession recess appointments as a precaution against presidential aggrandizement, but we have seen
that the holding created countervailing risks and harms-both
risks of collateral harm to the orderly functioning of government, and the perverse consequence of possibly increasing the
long-term risk of presidential aggrandizement itself' (p 77).82
Vermeule states that these countervailing risks are selfevident but fails to show how such vacancies endanger the orderly functioning of the government, especially given that, in
most cases, acting officials assume these roles. In this case, the
vacancies did present a problem to the functioning of the new
board. However, Noel Canning arose out of a broader disagreement in Congress over the function and funding of the NLRB.
The need for a quorum added to the pressure for compromise
with Congress, but ultimately it led to the president's
circumvention of Congress.
Additionally, it is hard to see how a decision of this kind really creates a perverse incentive for presidential aggrandizement. These ill-defined counterrisks are treated as simply commensurate with the circumvention of the Senate in its role of
confirmation. Clearly a president could respond to a negative
court decision in a fit of rage and flood the system with unconstitutional recess appointments. Indeed, she could take the same
bizarre step after negative rulings on free speech or free exercise
or federalism. However, the system has checks in place for such
abuses, particularly with the very judicial review process that
triggered this hypothetical bout of distemper.
In a work based on the proper understanding of risk and
countervailing risk, the discussion of recess appointments at
various points of the book is illustrative not only of the illdefined counterrisks, but also of the dismissive treatment of the
risks that are the subject of precautionary rulemaking. Regarding recess appointments, Vermeule virtually mocks the notion of
any real risk: "Recess appointments are hardly the stuff of which
tyranny is made, because of their inherently limited duration,
expiring at the end of the next congressional session" (p 40). He
previously dismissed Noel Canning's consideration of the risks of
82 While Vermeule sees the DC Circuit's decision as an example of runaway precautionary principles, I have criticized the opinion as a missed opportunity for establishing a
clearer nexus between the Recess Appointments Clause and the anti-aggrandizement (or
anti-aggregation) principles of the Constitution. See Turley, 93 BU L Rev at 1590-95
(cited in note 26).
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recess appointments as "a myopic approach to the regulation of
constitutional risks."83 Such a view is maintained only by discarding not just the risk of the aggrandizement of executive
power but also the countervailing value of the Senate's role in
federal appointments. In this case, confirmation of Richard
Cordray, the president's nominee to serve as the first director of
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, was blocked by forty-five senators over a disagreement with the president on the
accountability and funding of the bureau.84 Obama also appointed three individuals to the NLRB. The Senate used the confirmations to address those significant disagreements with the
White House.
The use of appointments in this fashion has become more
important with the rise of federal agencies.85 With the decreasing role of Congress in the regulations affecting most citizens
and the increasing power of the executive branch in our federal
system,86 appointments have become a key vehicle for Congress
to force answers from the executive branch and forge compromises in policy disputes. Putting aside the increasingly important role of confirmations as a check on the administrative
state, there is also the original purpose of guaranteeing that
high-ranking federal officials are placed in office with the consent of Congress to not only guarantee their qualifications but
also to reaffirm their authority and legitimacy. Finally,
Vermeule does not address the dangers of unilateral action and
the rise of a type of iiberpresidency-the subject of years of litigation and controversy. 87 While Vermeule scoffs at the notion of

83
84

Vermeule, 126 Harv L Rev F at 122 (cited in note 50).
Ylan Q. Mui, Sides Entrenched in Lead-Up to Vote on Consumer Agency, Wash

Post A15 (Dec 8, 2011).
85 See Turley, 93 BU L Rev at 1542-62 (cited in note 26).
86 It is striking that in a hearing concerning the planned House lawsuit against
Obama, even the Democratic witness agreed that there had been a worrisome rise in executive power at the expense of Congress. See Authorization to InitiateLitigation for Actions by the President Inconsistent with His Duties under the Constitution of the United
States, Hearing before the House Committee on Rules, 113th Cong, 2d Sess *5-6 (2014)
(statement of Simon Lazarus, Senior Counsel, Constitutional Accountability Center),
archived at http://perma.cc/Z5SH-4BGW.
87
See, for example, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co v Sawyer, 343 US 579, 593-94
(1952) (Frankfurter concurring) (discussing the possibility of the executive gaining "dangerous power"); Zivoto/sky v Clinton, 132 S Ct 1421, 1428 (2012) (discussing whether the
executive branch is "aggrandizing its power at the expense of another branch"). See also
Terry M. Moe and William G. Howell, The PresidentialPower of UnilateralAction, 15 J
L, Econ & Org 132, 154 (1999) (noting Jefferson's Louisiana Purchase, Lincoln's
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the dangers of such actions given their limited temporal impact,
he does not consider the context of increased presidential power
overall-a curiously abridged view given his expansive analysis
of countervailing risks. We are living in a time of tremendous
controversy over massive surveillance, kill lists, and other unilateral actions ordered under sweeping claims of executive power. Presumably all these orders could be discarded as lasting for
only the term of a president, like recess appointments, which
themselves can last for years.88 Despite his criticism of precautionary constitutionalists for ignoring countervailing risks,
Vermeule does precisely that in discussing the very risks that
motivate precautionary rulemaking.
Vermeule does offer what he considers a mature interpretation of the Recess Appointments Clause. He first suggests that
the DC Circuit could have simply ruled that "historical practice
has liquidated and fixed, within a range, the duration of intrasession recesses within which an appointment may be made"
(p 78). This use of historical practice is a classic functionalist position and one that I have criticized as a type of "constitutional
adverse possession."89 Under this approach, long-standing unconstitutional acts can alter the meaning of constitutional provisions like the Recess Appointments Clause. It is a position that
the DC Circuit-and, later, four members of the Supreme
Court-rejected. 90 In his concurrence, Justice Antonin Scalia
amplified this criticism in regard to the majority's use of historical practice:
What the majority needs to sustain its judgment is an ambiguous text and a clear historical practice. What it has is a
clear text and an at-best-ambiguous historical practice.
Even if the Executive could accumulate power through adverse possession by engaging in a consistent and
unchallenged practice over a long period of time, the

Emancipation Proclamation, Truman's desegregation of the military, and Johnson's affirmative action program as consequential unilateral actions taken by presidents).
88 See Turley, 93 BU L Rev at 1579 (cited in note 26).
89 Turley, 2013 Wis L Rev at 971 (cited in note 51).
90 Even before Noel Canning,the Supreme Court stressed in Free EnterpriseFund
v Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 561 US 477 (2010), that "the separation
of powers does not depend on the views of individual Presidents, nor on whether 'the encroached-upon branch approves the encroachment."' Id at 497, quoting New York v
United States, 505 US 144, 182 (1992) (citations omitted).
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oft-disputed practices at issue here would not meet that
standard. 91
Vermeule, however, offers an alternative optimizing interpretation in the event that simple historical-practice arguments
are not persuasive enough for those who are discomforted by the
inherent vagueness or elasticity therein. He argues that the DC
Circuit could have simply adopted a less textual and more
pragmatic approach based on a three-day rule founded in the
Adjournments Clause, which bars either house from adjourning
for more than three days during a congressional session without
the other's consent. 92 Thus, Vermeule concludes:
The three-day line offers exactly that, but with reduced
countervailing harms and risks, compared to the court's
rule. Even granting the concern with presidential aggrandizement, the court's highly precautionary holding represents a poor overall treatment of the relevant risks, in light
of the problems of jeopardy and perversity that the holding
created. (p78)
Again, putting aside the less-than-self-evident (and undefined)
"problems of jeopardy and perversity" that the DC Circuit's decision created, Vermeule somehow views a small window for possible intrasession recess appointments as resolving or at least
reducing those countervailing risks.
In fairness, however, it is a conclusion that the Supreme
Court's Noel Canning decision partially supports. While the
Court was unanimous in rejecting the recess appointments (and
supporting argument) by the Obama administration, five justices did use the Adjournments Clause as a guidepost, 93 while, as
previously noted, four justices rejected the historical-practice arguments underlying this theory. The majority issued a decision
that was striking in its fluidity or, as Vermeule might prefer, its
maturity. Using a mix of the Adjournments Clause and historical practice, the majority simply came up with a new presumptive range for recess appointments. It held that a recess of less
than ten days was presumptively too short. As if the basis for
this new constitutional standard was not ambiguous enough,
Justice Stephen Breyer added that this presumption could be
overcome in "some very unusual circumstance" but "[i]t should
91
92
93

Noel Canning, 134 S Ct at 2617 (Scalia concurring).
US Const Art I,§ 5, cl 4.
Noel Canning, 134 S Ct at 2566.
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go without saying ... that political opposition in the Senate
would not qualify as an unusual circumstance. 94 Such a mature
position is perfectly maddening for formalists and others who
support a strong separation of powers doctrine. Notably, the
Court itself does no more than Vermeule in showing the compelling countervailing dangers of a president being limited to intersession recesses in the use of this power. Even in introducing
an exception for "very unusual" circumstances (as opposed, presumably, to garden-variety unusual circumstances), Breyer does
not explain what those dangers might be that could motivate
such a departure from his new judicially fashioned rule.
The divergent lines of reasoning in Noel Canning will likely
prove to be another example of academics seeing the same object
and reaching diametrically opposite views as to its meaning. For
Vermeule, the justices in the majority largely succeeded in
shedding "themselves of standing commitments, fears, and obsessions" (p 190). For others, including formalists and me, what
the Court shed was the clarity of a constitutional structure that
serves to harness and direct the pressures of the political system
and prevent the concentration of authority in any given branch.
The lack of a defined risk-other than political gridlock (which is
a manifestation of a divided Congress and country)-did not
prevent the Court from claiming a balancing rationale for allowing appointments during a congressional session.
If one likes the reasoning and logic of Noel Canning, The
Constitution of Risk is likely a welcomed read. However, the
Noel Canning Court ultimately used the wrong means (in the
incorporation of ill-defined risk analysis) to reach the correct end
(in finding the appointments unconstitutional). The appointment process is part of a constitutional superstructure that was
effectively altered by Breyer in reaching a compromise on this
shared space between the branches. It is precisely the type of
modification that ignores the distinct role of structure in constitutional law, which is discussed below.
IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL SOFT VALUES AND THE NORMATIVE VALUE
OF STRUCTURE

The relative weight accorded to constitutional values and
risks in trade-offs remains a troubling uncertainty in Vermeule's
analysis. Even in more limited contexts like environmental
94

Id at 2567.
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regulation, risk analysis is often criticized due to the different
meaning or weight that people assign to given risks, as well as
the problem of imperfect information in assessing relative
risks. 95 Applying risk analysis to constitutional rulemaking
magnifies those problems when the risks are found in the context of free speech or other public policy areas.
Part of the difficulty in adopting Vermeule's analysis is that
these countervailing risks are not only poorly defined, but there
is also little insight into how to compare parts of the universe of
risks. For example, governmental regulation of speech combats
the countervailing risk of social discord and potential violence.
However, that risk can also be addressed by a host of measures
other than speech regulation. It is not just the risk, but also the
various means of achieving the reduction of the risk that must
be considered in any comparative analysis. For free speech, governmental regulation destroys its core value by both limiting
speech and creating a chilling effect. Yet the government can
combat the countervailing risk through regulation of the manifestation of discord or any violent response to speech. When
Vermeule insists that a better balance can be found in ex post
measures, he fails to recognize the impact of such uncertainty on
free speech by citizens, much like Justice Frankfurter. Indeed,
for Vermeule, such arguments seem ineffective (p 19). They also
constitute the very values that are outliers in Vermeule's riskcentric focus. These suggested gaps in Vermeule's theory can be
distilled into two central problems: the measurement of risk versus positive values and the normative value of structure.
A.

Weighing Virtues and Vices

The Vermeulean virtues laid out at the end of the book are
revealing in their indeterminacy. Vermeule argues for a break
with constitutional precautionary rules and structures based on
a loose discussion of risks, and he offers a list of highly generalized principles including, for example, maintaining flexibility.
These virtues are no more developed than the risks in the book
and, without such development, they seem more compelling as
the basis for an agency-level seminar than a new constitutional
theory. As hard as it is to argue with such aphorismic statements like "constitutional rulemakers should have no
95 See generally Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit
Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 Colum L Rev 941 (1999).
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obsessions" (p 188) (emphasis omitted), it is harder to embrace a
set of virtues when you are not entirely sold on the vices that
they are meant to combat.
Vermeule raises an interesting descriptive point about the
Constitution being viewed as a system of precautionary rules.
However, that observation is tied to an assertion that the precautionary constitutional approach does poorly in risk avoidance
and, conversely, that his theory of optimized constitutionalism is
a risk-optimal approach. Neither claim is persuasively made.
First, Vermeule expands the world of risks to challenge precautionary constitutionalism but, in so doing, he leaves risk as an
irrefutable and immeasurable tautology. Some risks, like aggrandizement, seem far more serious than Vermeule is willing to
concede despite the recent concern over the rise of an uiberpresidency in the United States. The Framers made a choice on
issues like aggrandizement. Vermeule can call it a risk rather
than a normative position, but it was a choice. Vermeule does
not seem to make such choices and instead argues that the
world will be inundated with risks that must be balanced and
addressed, often on a post hoc basis. This relativistic view of risk
leads to the second concern that, even if Vermeule were able to
better weigh and rank risks, his risk-based theory would be either more successful or more appealing than precautionary constitutionalism. If you view such risks as aggrandizement as existential threats to a democratic system, optimized constitutionalism
hardly appears risk-optimal.
The books' lack of discussion of the relative seriousness of
different risks (and the positive values protected by precautionary rules) raises many concerns in the long-standing debate over
"soft variables" in economics.96 While many economists challenge
the criticism, economic analysis in law is often seen as favoring
those elements that can be quantified to the disadvantage of
values in areas like environmental law. Indeed, there is often a
sense that law and economics can produce outcomedeterminative results and mask an agenda that opposes regulations and public welfare programs. Even those who reject this

96 See Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit
Analysis of Environmental Protection, 150 U Pa L Rev 1553, 1578-80 (2002); Richard
Craswell, Incommensurability, Welfare Economics, and the Law, 146 U Pa L Rev 1419,
1419 nn 1-2 (1998) (citing authors who present such views); Matthew Adler, Law and
Incommensurability:Introduction, 146 U Pa L Rev 1169, 1169-70 (1998); Laurence H.
Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology?, 2 Phil & Pub Affairs 66, 94-97 (1972).
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view acknowledge that it is important to find accurate measurements for values in any economic analysis. The same may be
true of a risk-based constitutional theory. Like many economic
values, risks and counterrisks are often not commensurate or
easily weighed.
Consider the risks in United States v Alvarez,97 in which the
Court struck down the Stolen Valor Act. 98 Under this popular
act, Congress effectively criminalized lying about military honors. The law was needed to address cases in which the liar did
not actually benefit financially from his or her false claims (since
such cases are routinely prosecuted as matters of fraud). On the
one hand, civil libertarians objected to the threat of criminalizing lies and the slippery slope risk to free speech values, including the chilling effect of such prosecutions. 99 On the other hand,
advocates of the law suggested, to borrow a quote from
Vermeule on recess appointments, that "the slope is not so very
slippery after all" and that it was highly unlikely that the government would want to prosecute other types of alleged lies in
the future (p 78).100 More importantly, advocates pointed to specific cases of especially egregious claims, even though these cases were relatively few in number and these claimants were demonstrably mentally unstable.
How does one measure the risk of governmental censorship
(or even the more difficult notion of a chilling effect on speech)?
As with the risk of aggrandizement, there is a suspicion that
Vermeule would likely weigh the risk of abuse (as he did the risk
of aggrandizement) relatively low. Even adopting loose historical
points of reference, our history is replete with government prosecutions of free speech and many more efforts at the state and
federal levels to curtail speech. 1 1 Indeed, we are living through a
132 S Ct 2537 (2012).
Stolen Valor Act of 2005, Pub L No 109-437, 120 Stat 3266 (2006), declared unconstitutional by Alvarez, 132 S Ct 2537. I have been a longtime critic of the Act. See, for
example, Turley, Undo the Stolen Valor Act, LA Times at A19 (cited in note 21).
99 See, for example, Jonathan Turley, Stolen Valor Offensive, but Is It Criminal?,
(NPR, Mar 9, 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/L58Z-DQ9L; Ramya Kasturi, Note,
Stolen Valor: A HistoricalPerspective on the Regulation of Military Uniform and Decorations, 29 Yale J Reg 419, 435 (2012).
100 Brief of Professors Eugene Volokh and James Weinstein as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, United States v Alvarez, No 11-210, *2 (US filed Dec 7, 2011) (available on Westlaw at 2011 WL 6179424).
101 Vermeule has long criticized civil libertarian arguments against executive power,
and he steadfastly contests the premise of historical abuses of civil liberties during
periods of national crisis:
97
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period in which many, including me, view free speech as under
attack in the West from laws designed to combat hate speech,

discriminatory speech, and other social

ills.102

For a constitu-

tional rulemaker, Vermeule suggests that all such risks must be
considered and that the rulemaker must retain flexibility. However, there is no indication of how to balance the incommensurate risks that are common to constitutional controversies. Indeed, constitutional risks present a far greater challenge than do
soft variables that must be weighted in economics, since constitutional risks are spread over myriad areas in a large society.
When Vermeule applies the type of balancing and flexible
approach that he advocates, it proves no more illuminating in
the context of controversies like recess appointments. Indeed,
just as many environmentalists often object to the translation of
nature and animal welfare under economic analysis as inherently devaluing, many constitutionalists are likely to react the
same way about converting constitutional values into constitutional risks. Vermeule's focus on risk as a comparative measure
requires a similar degree of translation. It is not the value of
free speech but the risk of the denial of free speech. The idea of
transliterating a value to a risk is not like converting Cyrillic to
There just are no systematic trends in the history of civil liberties, no important ratchet-like mechanisms that cause repeated wars or emergencies to
push civil liberties in one direction or another in any sustained fashion. Wars,
crises, and emergencies come in a range of shapes and sizes; the categories
themselves are just methodological conveniences, dichotomous cuts in continuous phenomena. It is unclear, given the current state of the empirical work,
whether wars and emergencies have any effect on civil liberties; if they do, the
effects may be complex and multiple, not simple and unidirectional. Especially
absent is any convincing reason to think that any political, social, or psychological ratchet, under which wars and emergencies have irreversible effects on future policies, operates. The best available empirical work finds no ratchet effects, in either direction, and the mechanisms said to create a ratchet are
implausible or underspecified.
Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, 56 Stan L Rev 605,
625 (2003) (citation omitted).
102 See, for example, Turley, Shut Up and Play Nice, Wash Post at B1 (cited in note
20); Mark A. Graber, Old Wine in New Bottles: The ConstitutionalStatus of Unconstitutional Speech, 48 Vand L Rev 349, 352-53 (1995) (questioning the position that the government can ban hate speech without violating First Amendment values); Ronald J.
Krotoszynski Jr, A Comparative Perspective on the FirstAmendment: Free Speech, Militant Democracy, and the Primacy of Dignity as a Preferred Constitutional Value in Germany, 78 Tulane L Rev 1549, 1550-51 (2004), quoting Jean Stefancic and Richard Delgado, A Shifting Balance:Freedom of Expression and Hate-Speech Restriction, 78 Iowa L
Rev 737, 742 (1993) (explaining that, looking at the case of Germany, "it is very difficult
to claim plausibly that limited regulation of hate speech does not invariably cause deterioration of the respect accorded free speech") (quotation marks omitted).
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Latin. The value of free speech presumptively exceeds the risk of
its denial, but it is not clear how such "lost in translation" problems are addressed in Vermeule's approach. Judging from his
applied examples, rights like free speech seem devalued once
balanced against other "risks." Likewise, absent some idea of
how relative risks are balanced or valued, the mature position of
Vermeule inevitably pulls away from a more structured approach, particularly formalism, in the maintenance of separation
of powers.
Vermeule spends comparatively little time on these nuances
of risk regulation. He notes that "[t]he term 'risk' has a colloquial sense that includes, under one large umbrella, well-defined
decision-theoretic concepts such as risk, uncertainty, and ignorance" (p 6). Vermeule further states that he "generally mean[s]
to use [the term risk in] the colloquial sense, except where the
context of particular problems otherwise requires" (p 6). The
page on risk and uncertainty does not offer much definitional
clarity on this core term for the work, or even on an understanding of what the "colloquial sense" of the word may be in
Vermeule's view. A vague notion of risk and corresponding
trade-off is a recurring theme in Vermeule's work.103 In Security
and Liberty: Critiques of the Tradeoff Thesis, Vermeule argues
for liberty-security trade-offs, insisting that this "tradeoff thesis"
between liberty and security "ought to be uncontroversial."104
Vermeule reduces security and liberty to goods that can be
charted like the production and allocation of any two goods in a
toy model economy. 0 5 This creates a "security-liberty possibility
frontier," showing that, at some point, "security cannot be increased without corresponding decreases in liberty, and

103 For example, in his book, Terror in the Balance: Security, Liberty and the Courts,
Vermeule criticizes civil libertarians as being virtually hysterical about fears of governmental abuse and insists that "[c]ivil liberties are compromised because civil liberties
interfere with effective response to the threat." Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule,
Terror in the Balance: Security, Liberty and the Courts 4 (Oxford 2007) (emphasis added).
In a direct example of the risk of quantifying constitutional values discussed above,
Vermeule advocates a balancing of liberties against national security that seems inevitably to favor the expansion of executive powers. See id at 16 ("The reason for relaxing
constitutional norms during emergencies is that the risks to civil liberties inherent in
expansive executive power ... are justified by the national security benefits.") (emphasis
added).
104 Adrian Vermeule, Security and Liberty: Critiques of the Tradeoff Thesis *4 (Harvard Public Law Working Paper No 11-19, 2011), archived at http:/Iperma.ccIJV84-HE2X.
105 See id at *2.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[82:517

vice-versa. 106 The conversion into a chart of binary goods with a
possibility frontier hardly captures the relative values (and necessity) of either liberty or security. It also treats liberty and security as inherently distinct values.107 The same concern is present in seeking to remove precautionary rules in favor of a
balancing of risks by rulemakers under optimizing constitutionalism. Vermeule offers little guidance on how to compare such
values (if at all) or their countervailing risks.
This uncertainty in Vermeule's view of risk is heightened in
his discussion of cases like Kelo (p 63). Vermeule's portrayal of
the universe of risks from the broad definition of public use in
Kelo is tellingly narrow. While heralding the expansive definition of public use (and by extension the risk of preventing highvalue public projects), Vermeule dismisses critics as concerned
with the "myopic[ ]" fear that "interest groups might cause legislatures to abuse the power of eminent domain" (p 63). However,
many (including many Framers) have viewed the Takings
Clause as protecting the positive value of private ownership and
individual rights generally. It is not simply the role of interest
groups but the overall guarantee of property rights to citizens at
risk. By reducing the risk of special dealing (which is clearly
part of the concern motivating the Takings Clause), Vermeule
more easily balances the counterrisk to New London in not being able to maximize public use in the land. Even if the town did
not succumb to the lobbyists of the pharmaceutical giant Pfizer,
the action would still have violated the core property protections
and rationales that existed before the Founding.108
The concern over how to weigh risks-and positive valuesincreases when one tries to elevate Vermeule's more insular
points to the level of a broader approach to constitutional theory.
Indeed, political risks are not the only risks that the Constitution was designed to avoid, unless one so broadly defines political risks to mean anything short of disasters, invasions, and

Id at *3.
Vermeule insists that he understands the objection to such trade-offs: "It is not a
normative argument that, somehow, it is a good thing to trade off security and liberty (a
bizarre sort of argument to make); of course more of both is better when possible. But we
cannot always have more of both." Id.
108 The special-dealing concerns were obviously present, particularly when the town
blissfully handed over its power of eminent domain-the ability to take private property
for public use-to the private New London Development Corporation (NLDC). See Kelo,
545 US at 495 (O'Connor dissenting) (noting that the NLDC "is not elected by popular
vote, and its directors and employees are privately appointed").
106

107
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other public threats. Vermeule at times seems to adopt such a
broad notion of second-order risks (pp 7-9). The risks to liberty,
however, would not be viewed by the Framers, or many academics, as solely political risks. Likewise, entanglement with religion (while certainly motivated by politics) would not have been
viewed as a second-order risk, let alone a political risk.
Vermeule again is rather opaque in his definition of these terms.
First-order risks are described as risks that are "dealt with by
substantive governmental policies" (p 3). He describes those
risks as including "unintended consequence[s] of human action"
such as terrorism or market failures (p 3). Such risks might also
include forces of nature like flooding (p 3). Those risks are contrasted with second-order risks, which "arise from the design of
institutions, from the allocation of power across institutions to
make first-order decisions, and from the selection of officials of
staff institutions" (pp 3-4). Once again, it is a division that
leaves the principal concerns of the Framers regarding liberty
dangerously unaccounted for on the risk spectrum. The Framers
did not focus on first-order risks such as flooding but instead
were concerned primarily with tyranny in various forms as well
as with censorship, religious entanglements, and other threats
to liberty. Indeed, the Framers more often spoke of the Constitution's design in terms of positive values like free speech than the
negative expression of risk.
The ill-defined risks add to the later uncertainty of how to
actually apply Vermeule's theory, as well as to uncertainty regarding the level of rulemaking that is best subjected to its riskregulation approach. Vermeule's "mad ambition" will remain an
apt description absent a better idea of how this theory would actually apply to constitutional questions beyond recommendations of flexibility and avoiding obsessions. Discussions of firstorder and second-order concerns in agency decisionmaking are
interesting but far more limited in their use to decisionmakers.
It is an insightful perspective for administrative law, but such
rulemaking decisions do not speak to a broader application in
constitutional analysis.
B.

Madisonian Tectonics and the Normative Value of Structure

The second (and related) problem concerns the value of constitutional structure in such a theory. As Vermeule acknowledges, Madison saw value in precautionary mechanisms. However,
viewing the Madisonian system through the lens of risk tends to
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focus attention on the manifestation of certain types of conduct
or abuse. It also tends to evaluate the system by examining outcomes or consequences. The consequentialist perspective treats
the tripartite structure as merely the framework within which
certain powers play out in the political arena. Such a view favors
a functionalist approach to conflicts, in which judicial interventions are discouraged and precautionary rules tend to be minimized. It also tends to convert conceptions like democratic legitimacy and ordered liberty into the more limiting framework of
risks like bias, partiality, or corruption in government. The value of foundational principles is then lost in translation, as discussed earlier. The risk-centric analysis presents the same problem in dealing with the constitutional structure itself as a
distinct conception of the Framers with its own inherent value.
Past theories, including Vermeule's work, tend to reduce
structure to an instrumentalist vehicle for achieving certain insular functions. Those functions are then compared by Vermeule
to the risks avoided and not avoided as a result of constitutional
rulemaking. This approach does not allow for the structure itself
to constitute more than just a precautionary system of checks
and balances. The Framers did not solely speak of the risks that
Vermeule isolates in his work. They also spoke of directing interests and factions in a transformative political system. They
spoke of values linking democratic process to the inherent rights
of the governed. The structure was not simply a general framework for human action but an organic system of human interaction that shapes political exchanges.
Vermeule is by no means unique in disregarding the inherent value of structure or viewing separation conflicts largely in
terms of outcomes. Indeed, the role and function of structure has
attracted relatively little attention in constitutional theory, at
least in the sense of normative-or at least deontological-value
to structure. In a forthcoming article, I explore the synergies between architectural and constitutional theory in looking at the
role of structure. 1 9 The concept of the formal and the functional
pervades both architectural and legal interpretations in ways
that are strikingly similar, including the reliance on many of the
same ideas of human expression and experiences. Indeed, modern architectural theory has long focused on the concepts of

109 See generally Turley, 83 Geo Wash L Rev (cited in note 12).

20151

A Fox in the Hedges

structure and space in a way that should resonate with legal
scholars.
A "conarchitectural" perspective focuses on the role of structure and whether there is central truth to structural principles
shared by both physical and organizational space. "Form follows
function" is a virtual mantra of modern architectural thought, a
view most associated with modernist Ludwig Mies van der
Rohe. 110 Mies called these values "tectonics," the inherent truth
of a structure found in its supportive forms and the material
construction.111 Mies's structural innovations allowed the superstructure and cruciform columns, rather than interior loadbearing walls, to carry load.112 This allowed for a "free plan" in
which non-load-bearing walls could be used for interior partitions and greater flexibility of space. While the free plan suggests a more fluid understanding of interior form, it also reflects
two countervailing principles. First is the importance of the superstructure. Mies insisted that "the structure is the backbone of
the whole and makes the free plan possible. Without that backbone the plan would not be free, but chaotic and therefore constipated."113 Second, the partitions within a structure are not
load bearing but are designed to partition space in optimal ways.
They control the perspective and movement of those inside the
superstructure. Unlike modernists like Le Corbusier, Mies tended to avoid free open space in favor of the use of walls to demark
interior spaces while emphasizing flow.14 The walls defined
space as a visual aspect. Both these exterior and interior structures allowed for a design to reflect the truth of building as vividly demonstrated by the Barcelona Pavilion.l"5

110 This widely cited theory is associated with Mies and his designs, but it is more
fairly attributed to Louis Sullivan. See id at *6.
111 Id at *8.
112 See Bjorn N. Sandaker, Arne P. Eggen, and Mark R. Cruvellier, The Structural
Basis of Architecture 199 (Routledge 2d ed 2011).
113 Christian Norberg-Schulz,
Talks with Mies van der Rohe, L'Architecture
d'Aujourd'hui (Architecture Today) 79 (Sept 1958).
114 The main interest in Mies is to explore the concept of form and his view of an inherent truth in tectonics. When it came to interior design, Mies emphasized free flowing
space while using non-load-bearing walls in delineating space. Of course, when it suited
the function of the structure, Mies could design a largely open space such as in his design for Crown Hall at the Illinois Institute of Technology--one of his most minimalist
conceptions. See Robert Bersson, Responding to Art: Form, Content, and Context 296-97
(McGraw-Hill 2004).
115 See Turley, 83 Geo Wash L Rev at *33 (cited in note 12).
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Mies saw structure as a reflection not just of the physical elements of a building but also of an understanding of human nature. Just as writers like Madison explored aspects of human
nature within a governmental structure, Mies explored how
structure affects and represents those within it. Indeed, both
Madison and Mies discussed many of the same philosophical
ideas in their writings on constitutional and architectural structures. 116 The importance of the modernist notions of structure is
not to pretend that they can be directly applied to the law, but
rather that they offer a different way of viewing form and structure. While the theory that "form follows function" might be seen
as favoring a consequentialist view or at least a functionalist
view, it actually suggests something quite different: structure
has a normative value and there is an essential truth to certain
types of structure or tectonics.
The same may be true about constitutional structure. The
"truth" in constitutional form lies in its reflection of normative
values linking democratic processes to individual liberty and
participatory expression. "IT]he participatory process ensures
that although no man, or group, is master of another, all are
equally dependent on each other and equally subject to the
law."117 The constitutional structure was tied to the ideals of selfgovernment and individual liberty that emerged in the eighteenth century. The Framers would have understood the sentiment expressed by Mies when he said, "Architecture is the will
' s The Constitution was the
of an epoch translated into space."11
will of the Framers' epoch translated into constitutional form.
The constitutional structure was designed to achieve a form of
government that reflects the values of self-government and deliberative democracy. In this sense, for Madison and others, the
line between form and function was blurred. The form was the
function that they were describing in their writings. To borrow
from the Dworkian distinction, it was both the concept and conception itself for some Framers.119
116

See id at *51-52.

117

Carole Pateman, Participationand Democratic Theory 27 (Cambridge 1970).
David Watkin, Morality and Architecture Revisited 44 (John Murray 2001).

118

119 See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 134 (Harvard 1977). Dworkin argued that the general "concepts," and not the specific "conceptions," of the Framers
should guide constitutional interpretation. Id at 135-36. When it comes to the separation
of powers and structural questions discussed above, however, the concept and the conception are indistinguishable. It is the conception (the structural norm) that should
guide the interpretation.
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Structure clearly has a more dynamic meaning in architectural theory. However, some political figures have recognized
the impact of structure on the choices and perspectives of individuals. Winston Churchill once said that "[tlhere is no doubt
whatever about the influence of architecture and structure upon
human character and action. We make our buildings and afterwards they make us."120 Modernists in architecture understood
that structures not only represent human values, but that they
can also shape human values and choices. Indeed, some of the
observations regarding the role of structure seem almost Madisonian, such as Mies's view that structure is designed to "create
order" by "allocating to each thing its proper place and giving to
each thing its due according to its nature.121 Both Mies and
Madison saw structure as resisting a human tendency toward
chaos or factional instability. It does not merely reflect functions; it also shapes human behavior.122 The demarcation of
space within a structure directs the view and the interaction of
the occupants.
Indeed, structures often reflect varying degrees of what are
called deterministic designs-that is, spaces designed to direct
or influence the occupants in making choices.123 The Framers
seemed to have envisioned a similar type of constitutionaldeterministic architecture in shaping the choices of decisionmakers and actors within the system. The constitutional
structure limits the horizon for actors and labels certain types of
conduct as inimical to the values underlying the system, particularly the anti-aggrandizement values. The separation of powers
is not simply some giant precautionary mechanism, as one
might conclude in a Vermeulean world, but an organic space
that is designed to convert or direct energy and movement. The
form shapes the functioning of the system and sets the behavior
horizons for the occupants. Structure and space in the physical

120 Paul Goldberger, Why Architecture Matters 1 (Yale 2009) (quoting Churchill's
address to the English Architectural Association in 1924).
121 Nancy B. Solomon, ed, Architecture: Celebratingthe Past, Designing the Future
152 (Visual Reference 2008).
122 Mies insisted: "The long path from material through function to creative work
has only one goal: to create order out of the desperate confusion of our time. We must
have order, allocating to each thing its proper place and giving to each thing its due according to its nature." Turley, 83 Geo Wash L Rev at *6 (cited in note 12).
123 See Alexi Marmot, Architectural Determinism: Does Design Change Behaviour?,
52 Brit J Gen Prac 252, 252-53 (Mar 2002).
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world has long been recognized as influencing human perception
and conduct.124 The same seems true of constitutional structure.
Part of the tripartite structure is clearly designed to avoid
risks or negative conduct by subjecting decisions to the interplay
of different constituencies and institutional interests. These successive encounters tend to winnow out more divisive proposals
and ideas. However, it would be inaccurate to describe these divisional rules as purely precautionary and concerned with the
risks of governance. 21 5 The process of deliberation and approval
is tied to obvious democratic values and the core principle of limiting the authority of any given individual or institution in the
political process. The consequentialist view of structure artificially marginalizes its role in shaping and labeling actions. By
directing certain types of activities into optimal "rooms" or
"spaces," the Framers sought to roughly shape the types or
forms of decisions that would be made within the system. The
structure has a behavioral dimension connected to a determinative design.
"Optimization" takes on a different meaning for those who
study human behavior. While economists often speak of human
efforts to maximize utility, other disciplines question the predictability of human actions without more complex considerations of the context or environment in which those actions occur.
In his work on variants of human behavior, psychologist Herbert
Simon put it simply:
If we wish to know what form gelatin will take when it solidifies, we do not study the gelatin; we study the shape of
the mold in which we are going to pour it. In the same way,
the economist who wishes to predict behavior studies the
environment in which the behavior takes place, for the rational economic actor will behave in whatever way is appropriate to maximize utility in that environment. Hence (assuming the utility function to be given in advance), this

124

See Yannick Joye, Architectural Lessons from Environmental Psychology: The

Case of Biophilic Architecture, 11 Rev Gen Psychology 305, 305-06 (2007) (describing the
influence that space aesthetics in architecture and nature can have on the human
psyche).
125 Indeed, in the public-choice scholarship, the legislative process has been criticized as failing to achieve true majoritarian results. See Jonathan Turley, Transnational
Discriminationand the Economics of ExtraterritorialRegulation, 70 BU L Rev 339, 35458 (1990); William N. Eskridge Jr, Politics without Romance: Implications of Public
Choice Theory for StatutoryInterpretation,74 Va L Rev 275, 280-83 (1988).
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maximizing behavior is purely a function of the environment, and quite independent of the actor.
The same strategy can be used to construct a psychology
of thinking. If we wish to know how an intelligent person
will behave in the face of a particular problem, we can investigate the requirements of the problem. Intelligence consists precisely in responding to these requirements.126
Simon explores "bounded rationality" and considers such human
conduct and choices in a given environment.12 Economic and
public policy works often struggle to predict the impact of
bounded-rationality problems and their negative impact on social or market outcomes. My point is not to say that boundedrationality elements are necessarily positive in a constitutional
context any more than they are viewed as positive in behavior
economics. However, this literature shows that environment and
structures can influence how choices are viewed and made.
Constitutional structure can be thought of in a similar sense as
shaping how rulemakers perceive their roles and actions-and
how citizens view those choices. To use Simon's example, the
Framers sought to pour the gelatin of politics into a mold that
would optimize results and structure decisionmaking. It is that
very structure that is undermined by Vermeule's optimizing
constitutionalism in the removal of precautionary mechanisms.
More importantly, the structure of the constitutional system can
be viewed more organically as reflecting a view of the Framers
as not just combatting particular risks but also confining and directing choices in a deliberative process of government.
In addition to the writings referencing structure and human
nature by writers like Madison and Mies, there are other useful
comparisons that can be drawn from a conarchitectural perspective. "Choice architecture," discussed in legal literature, is another crossover analogy, particularly with deterministic architecture.128 Libertarian paternalists seek to address the problems
126

Herbert A. Simon, Invariants of Human Behavior, 41 Ann Rev Psychology 1, 6

(1990).
Herbert A. Simon, 1 Models of Thought 3 (Yale 1979).
Choice architecture often focuses on incentives and structures that encourage
efficient or "right" decisionmaking. See, for example, Richard H. Thaler and Cass R.
Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth and Happiness 81-100
(Yale 2008). The discussion of choice architecture in areas like consumer decisionmaking
is obviously different from this context of actual structural forms. This scholarship prefers choice architecture rather than paternalistic lawmaking in some markets and regulations. See id.
127

128
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of heuristics and biases in individual decisionmaking through
the creation of environments that "nudge" individuals into the
right or most efficient choices. 129 Like the Framers, libertarian
paternalists maintain the right to make choices, even bad choices, but seek to create structures that encourage individuals to
make the right choices. This role of the government as choice architect in "organizing the context in which people make decisions"130 is not unlike the role of constitutional architects. What
is particularly striking about choice-architecture literature is
how even negative manifestations of bounded rationality are
sometimes used to direct choices or actions.31 Choice architecture does not approve of such bias any more than the Framers
approved of self-dealing or self-aggrandizing conduct. However,
one can create a structure in which such motives or biases are
directed in a positive direction or used to shape outcomes. The
desire is to allow people the freedom of choice while creating a
structure that funnels certain types of decisions. That influence
derives not just from the structural limitations themselves but
also from labeling certain types of conduct as inherently bad or
dangerous, as with the use of unilateral or aggregated power.
For example, one common manifestation of bounded rationality
is the anchoring heuristic-the idea that individuals retain an
initial pricing or view of an object or option.132 Constitutional
structure creates an anchoring effect for citizens in perceiving
and labeling the actions of public officials. The circumvention of
vested powers runs counter to anchored values instilled in the
structure and language of the Constitution. Likewise, there is an
"extremeness aversion" factor that can influence decisions. 133 By
maintaining strong structural principles, efforts to circumvent
or exceed power limitations are anchored in meaning as extreme
and disfavored behavior. Problems of bounded rationality and
biases such as anchoring are negative responses that behavioral
economists struggle to overcome. However, these responses can
reflect how people establish values and assumptions that can be
129 Id at 6.
130 Id at 3.
131 See On Amir and Orly Lobel, Stumble, Predict, Nudge: How BehavioralEconomics Informs Law and Policy, 108 Colum L Rev 2098, 2116 (2008) (noting that some
choice-architecture proposals "rely on biases to generate a better outcome").
132 See Cass R. Sunstein, ed, BehavioralLaw and Economics 5 (Cambridge 2000).
133 Id at 3 ("People are averse to extremes. Whether an option is extreme depends on
the stated alternatives .... As between given alternatives, most people seek a
compromise.").
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used in a positive way.134 In constitutional architecture, the
structure is both deterministic in part and persuasive in part in
advancing constitutional values like deliberative democracy.
The normative role of structure is lost in Vermeule's narrow,
risk-centric vision. Consider again Vermeule's discussion of recess appointments (pp 39-41). From a risk-centric standpoint,
the division of authority between the legislative and executive
branches is simply the manifestation of risk regulation to prevent presidential aggrandizement on one side and administrative occlusion on the other. However, from a conarchitectural
viewpoint, the structure is designed to funnel not just different
constituencies but also different interests into the decisional
mix. The Senate brings a different inquiry and produces a different dynamic for federal appointments. A president is primarily interested in selecting a nominee who will carry out executive
policies in a competent and faithful way. The president is also
interested in selecting an individual who is popular or at least
sufficiently noncontroversial to secure confirmation and public
support. The Senate, in contrast, is often interested more in understanding the nominee's policy preferences when questioning
a nominee about his or her intentions and credentials. 135 This
mixing of different interests and perspectives tends to winnow
out extreme choices and also tends to address divisive issues
concerning the management of federal offices upfront. The
threat of a vacancy is precisely the incentive that a president
needs to engage in such a dialogic process with Congress.
As with many functionalist theories, Vermeule's risk-based
theory tends to treat structure as merely a series of rules or an
inert framing for constitutional decisionmaking. The consequentialist focus of his work dismisses or ignores the aspect of

134 See Anuj C. Desai, LibertarianPaternalism,Externalities,and the "Spiritof Liberty". How Thaler and Sunstein Are Nudging Us toward an "OverlappingConsensus", 36
L & Soc Inquiry 263, 273 (2011) (describing how choice architecture can be "a form of
'rebiasing,' [that is,] the use of one bias to respond to another ') (citation omitted).
135 The different interests in confirmation hearings were on open display in the Senate's consideration of the nomination of Loretta Lynch for attorney general. See generally Lynch Hearing (discussing the role of confirmation hearings during periods of interbranch conflicts). The Justice Department has been at the center of a series of conflicts
between the legislative and executive branches. This has included litigation between the
branches, including a case in which the House of Representative voted to sue President
Obama over unilateral changes to the federal health care law. The author is the lead
counsel in that case, United States House of Representative v Burwell. Michael R. Crittenden, House Republicans Hire Jonathan Turley to Pursue Obama Lawsuit (Wall St J,
Nov 18, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/49MN-GZFC.
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structure and space as having a normative value in itself. Indeed, in his earlier book with Professor Eric Posner on the rise of
the "imperial presidency," The Executive Unbound: After the
MadisonianRepublic, Vermeule argues that people should simply shed their inhibitions regarding the rise of presidential power
as an inevitable trend.136 Ironically, this argument is the very
type of futility argument that Hirschman criticized in his work
on reactionary rhetoric.137 The ascension of presidential power is
treated as unavoidable, and resistance (at least legal resistance)
is treated as futile. Vermeule's negative view of the separation of
powers, 138 which he and Posner refer to as "suffering through an
enfeebled old age," is expressed even more directly in that earlier book. 139 The book dismisses the Madisonian perspective and
the viability of the system of checks and balances in combating
such concentrated authority.140 Instead, Vermeule and Posner
assure readers that the new executive-centered state can generate its own effective political checks that can substitute for constitutional checks141 They argue that "[w]e live in a regime of
executive-centered government, in an age after the separation of
powers, and the legally constrained executive is now a historical
curiosity."142 Putting aside the merits of that easily challenged
theory, it ignores the role of constitutional structure in forcing
governmental actors into beneficial interactions and dialogue.
Moreover, the authors' faith in political over legal constraints is
Posner and Vermeule, Executive Unbound at 11-12 (cited in note 16).
Indeed, Hirschman likened this type of argument to the following statement
from Alice in Wonderland: "Here it takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same
place." Hirschman, Rhetoric of Reaction at 44 (cited in note 9). Hirschman described the
futility argument as a "disarmingly simple" form of rhetoric that posits:
[Tihat the attempt at change is abortive, that in one way or another any alleged change is, was, or will be largely surface, facade, cosmetic, hence illusory
136
137

All these spirited statements deride or deny efforts at, and possibilities of,
change while underlining and perhaps celebrating the resilience of the status
quo.
Id at 43-44.
138 This view of the failure of the Madisonian argument for checks and balances is
repeated in not only this book (p 130) but also his prior work. See Adrian Vermeule, The
System of the Constitution 39-43 (Oxford 2011).
139 Posner and Vermeule, Executive Unbound at 208 (cited in note 16).
140 Indeed, for a Madisonian scholar, the book takes on a certain Strangelove-ian
aspect and could be more aptly entitled "How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the
Imperial Presidency."
141 They further argue that "a wealthy and highly educated population" is a strong
safeguard of democracy. Posner and Vermeule, Executive Unbound at 14 (cited in note 16).
142 Id at 4.

2015]

A Fox in the Hedges

based on the same use of generalized analysis criticized above.
For example, they point to the area of war powers to show that
legal limitations have little influence on presidents and that decisions like Hamdi v Rumsfeld,143 Hamdan v Rumsfeld,44 and
Boumediene v Bush 145 did not materially alter the Bush administration's policies as much as a change in the political environment did.146 This mirrors Vermeule's analysis discussed above of
the unreliability of judges who have shown a tendency to be
"swept away" during periods of crisis (p 57). The failure of the
courts to fulfill their constitutional function in the area of war
powers is certainly mirrored by the historical failure of Congress
to assert its own powers. Most academics hold no briefs for either the judicial or legislative branches in their exercise of inherent authority and independence during crises. However, the
lack of integrity and independence shown by members of both
branches in the face of the rise of an ilberpresidency hardly
serves to reassure citizens of the viability of political checks. It
was the political influence on these officials that led to the internment of Japanese Americans and the more recent failure to
stop the Bush torture program. Humans are flawed, a reality
that writers from Montesquieu to Madison incorporated into
their views on the structure of government.147 Yet embracing political over legal checks is to heal the patient by simply calling
the illness the cure.
Vermeule's preference for informal political and often ex
post remedies has been a consistent feature in his work-as has
the consequentialist perspective of constitutional issues. A riskcentric theory plays well to that inclination as does its more
functionalist approach to resolving issues. Yet the use of risk as
the touchstone for a new theory can mask its own subjectivity
and assumptions. Vermeule's admiration for Frankfurter is telling in this respect given Frankfurter's own consequentialist tendency and rather fluid legal principles. 148 As with quantifying
values in economics, a risk-based theory offers little if risk is ill
defined and the test is one that simply professes flexibility or
nonobsessive analysis. It tends, as does Vermeule's earlier work,
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to free the system of its constitutional moorings and leave it
adrift on a sea of politics. Indeed, during decades of fluid understanding of recess appointments, the result was endless forms of
brinkmanship and dysfunctional tit-for-tat politics. The reinforcement of the structure for such appointment will likely reduce those fights fueled by the uncertainty of the relative authority of the branches. While the Supreme Court diminished
the value of that corrective measure with its ad hoc test, the
Noel Canning decision will still benefit the political system by
reaffirming the checks and balances of that system.
CONCLUSION

Berlin's famous observation of the fox and the hedgehog is
derived from old fables that refer to a fox and a cat. 149 In the
most common version, the fox boasts to the cat that he has many
tricks to elude a hunter, while the cat says that she has only
one: to climb a tree. When a hunter and his dogs suddenly appear, the cat quickly climbs a tree while the fox hesitates in deciding which trick to use-only to be eaten. 10 As someone who
would be viewed by Vermeule as a one-trick, precautionary academic, I must admit that I am drawn to the fact that the cat
used the most reliable structure, in this case a tree, to save its
life. However, the point is made that many small tricks may not
save you when confronted with an existential risk. This is precisely how many view the current rise of presidential power.
Vermeule is quite nimble in describing different political influences on presidents as well as an array of mechanisms (including some precautionary ones) to deal with risks. As with his
earlier work, one is left skeptical of his ability to eventually
avoid the insatiable appetite of an uiberpresident. Moreover, as
Vermeule unloads his many tricks in dealing with risk, there is
a loss of clarity for the branches and decisionmakers in their expected dealings with one another. While Vermeule promises
more flexibility, he loses the predictability sought by the
Framers in structuring political discourse and decisionmaking.
Thus, when Vermeule calls for the removal of precautionary
rules against self-dealing as part of his impartiality discussion,
he offers this approach as a substitute: "Where other precautions
149 See D.L. Ashliman, The Fox and the Cat or the Fox and the Hedgehog, archived
at http://perma.cc/5A9Q-CUZ3.
150 In some versions, the fox has an actual bag of tricks that weighs him down, but
he refuses the advice of the cat to drop the bag. See id.
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or remedies are indeed available, the rulemaker faces a choice
and should adopt the solution that produces greatest net benefits, not necessarily the solution that strictly minimizes the risk
of self-dealing" (p 139). This is a small example of the fluidity
and indeterminacy of Vermeule's approach. It denies the system
of clear lines that not only guard against self-dealing but
also contribute to the broader reinforcement of the system as a
whole for all participants. These clear lines in the Madisonian
system were encouraged in light of a view of human nature and
the need for reinforcement. In a word: structure.
It would be unfair to view Vermeule's work as the confessions of a fox that wanted to be a hedgehog. Vermeule contests
the very viability of the hedgehog view of constitutionalism.151
He unabashedly sells his theory as a rejection of the concept of
the type of overarching big theories of constitutional law. Indeed, Vermeule insists that his is a theory of constitutional argumentation and that "the set of constitutional rules that will
result is not my concern here" (p 53). That is certainly true of
the first proposition of the book (the best part of the book),
which suggests a new way of looking at constitutions with firstorder and second-order risks. However, Vermeule's admitted
mad ambition transcends that purpose in his desire to offer a
single, unified theory of constitutionalism. Vermeule complains
that we simply have too many different theories of constitutionalism that find what he has called an "irreducible plurality" of
constitutional goods. 152 He offers his risk perspective as a way to
produce a "common coin" among these theories.153 However, the
common coin that Vermeule suggests as the basis for his theory
is openly consequentialist, and the inevitable outcome in many
cases is clearly functionalist.
In the end, the second objective of the book falls short of its
greater ambition in its failure to address the soft variables or
constitutional values that can be lost in risk analysis, as well as
the largely undefined relationship of different types of risk in
the calculus of risk. Vermeule asks too much in seeking to strip
away precautionary mechanisms-and indeed the core assumptions of the separation of powers-without a better articulation
of the trade-offs that he anticipates in his brave new world of
risk regulation.
151 See Book Talk at 54:32-54:55 (cited in note 1).
152 Id at 3:52-4:14.
153 Id at 5:06-5:12.
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My criticism of Vermeule's analysis ultimately does not take
away from my view that this book makes a valuable contribution: his interesting observations concerning precautionary constitutionalism and risk regulation. However, Vermeule is simply
a far better fox than hedgehog. In the end, the concerns about
weighing risks and valuing structure remain largely unanswered. Instead, Vermeule responds to those who cringe at precautionary principles as failing to consider a better constitutional rule. With a witty twist on Voltaire's warning of the best
being the enemy of the good, Vermeule insists that precautionary critics show that the "good may be the enemy of the still better" (p 98). Yet the risk-centric approach that Vermeule describes is hardly an improvement in light of its ill-defined risks
and troubling indeterminacy of power. It is certainly not inviting
for those who subscribe to a less consequentialist perspective of
the Constitution. For those readers, one thing is clear: The
Constitutionof Risk is not for the risk averse.

